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ABSTRACT
Cross-border conflicts on the African continent have increased tremendously in the post-colonial
years. The widespread border conflicts on the African continent have been attributed to the
arbitrariness with which Africa’s national boundaries were drawn during the colonial period. The
colonial boundaries have left the doors open for perpetual conflicts among African states.
This thesis proposes to investigate the prospects of grassroots diplomacy as an  option of dealing with
border conflicts with specific reference to the case of Lesotho/South Africa border relations. This is
done by critically evaluating the role the District Liaison Committees (DLCs) have played in border
relations between Lesotho and South Africa. The Lesotho and South African governments have
institutionalised the resolution of border conflicts at grassroots level through the establishment of the
DLCs. The DLCs consists of representatives of border communities in Lesotho and South Africa.
The paper introduces a not so familiar concept of involving people at grassroots levels in the
conducting of diplomacy between the two neighbouring countries. The central issue implicit in this
paper is that grassroots diplomacy is succeeding in the case of Lesotho and South Africa. The DLCs
have managed to reduce tension between the two countries along the borders which had existed over
a long period of time, thereby, relieving the central governments of some of their duties. The thesis
contents that high level conventional diplomacy is not always the answer to cross-border conflicts.
The example of Lesotho and South Africa could be followed by other African countries in similar
situations. 
1 CHAPTER 1
1.   INTRODUCTION
1.1   Diplomacy
The term ‘diplomacy’ has been used to denote several different things. According to Nicolson
(1939:13) some people use it as a synonym for foreign policy.  It may also be  used to imply
negotiations. Sometimes people use it to denote the processes and machinery by which such
negotiation is carried out. Some people use it to imply a branch of the foreign service. Another
interpretation of the term refers to  skill in the conduct of international negotiation. Nicolson sees
diplomacy as an essential element in any reasonable relation between man and man and between
nation and nation. He argues that the function of diplomacy is to manage relations between
independent states by processes of negotiation.
According to Berridge (1995:1), “diplomacy is the conduct of international relations by negotiation
rather than by force, propaganda or recourse to law, and by other peaceful means (such as gathering
information or engendering  goodwill) which are either directly or indirectly designed to promote
negotiation.” It is an activity which is regulated by custom and by law. It is  flexible. Although it has
been a professionalised activity, non-professionals have come to play  an important part in it.
The importance of diplomacy was realised by states a long time ago. It is not a new concept at all.
Even states which are not on friendly terms have recognised that they have a mutual interest in
communicating with each other, verbally and nonverbally. Diplomacy is not simply about negotiation.
It also involves “... gathering information, clarifying intentions and, among other things, looking after
citizens in distress in foreign countries (Berridge,1994:10).
Different ways in  which diplomacy can be promoted between states have been identified by some
scholars. States with diplomatic relations may have  resident embassies in each other’s countries or
they could have non-resident embassies in a third country. In cases where states do  not
 have diplomatic relations as a result of either non-recognition or formal breach of  
2relations, there may be other methods of conducting diplomacy. They could, for instance,  conduct
their business through an intermediary, the disguised embassies,  which include interest sections,
consulates, diplomatic fronts and trade missions. The working funeral is also one of the platforms for
conducting of diplomacy (Berridge,1994).
Berridge (1995:177) contends that the institutionalisation of diplomacy occurred because of the
enduring significance of the balance of power in the European states-system. This balance of power
instigated and required the reflex of international negotiation. However, he warns us that “it is easy
to lose sight of the essential character of diplomacy because of the multiplication of channels through
which the activity is now conducted and even greater multiplication in the kinds of people, including
political leaders, which it now involves” (Berridge, 1995 : 177). 
1.2  Grassroots Diplomacy
The warning of  Berridge   is of particular relevance to this study because it deals with a different kind
of diplomacy with which many scholars may not be familiar with, or have not yet explored. This is
what the ex-South African High Commissioner in Lesotho, Mr Visser, once referred to as “grassroots
diplomacy” (Coetzee,1994). 
Thus by grassroots diplomacy, I am particularly  referring to the method of resolving of conflicts
which characterises border relations between Lesotho and South Africa. These border conflicts have
been part and parcel of Lesotho/South African relations for as long these two countries existed. The
resolution of these conflicts has now been institutionalised through the establishment of the District
Liaison Committees (DLCs), which have been established jointly by the Lesotho and South African
governments to enable the communities living along the borders to deal with border difficulties. In
this way,  people at grassroots level are actually given a chance to determine their own needs and
solve their own problems in dealing with their counterparts across the border. 
The DLCs encourage cooperation between the communities living along the border. They are forums
where the communities (especially the farming communities) on both sides of the border exchange
3ideas, give each other technical advice about  farming matters and work side by side to deal with
cross-border stock theft, which is a major problem for these communities. They also encourage other
activities to improve  relations between their communities, such as interschool visits. These
committees then make recommendations to both the Lesotho and South African governments on how
they can be assisted.
1.3  The Subject
This study is an attempt to look at grassroots diplomacy and assess  how effective it has been in
mediating relations between Lesotho and South Africa. In the light of Berridge’s (1995) warning that
it is easy to lose sight of the essential character of diplomacy due to the multiplication of channels
through which the activity is now conducted,  this study  is an attempt to deal with one aspect of
diplomacy which scholars have not yet explored satisfactorily. In the existing literature,  Ambassador
Visser has been the only one who  has mentioned this missing aspect of diplomacy between these two
countries, namely, grassroots diplomacy.  He has described relations between Lesotho and South
Africa as “grassroots diplomacy at its best”. By this he meant that there is a state on state
communication at the highest level but also person-to-person communication at the lowest level
(Coetzee, 1994:18).
This study proposes to take the subject of grassroots diplomacy between Lesotho and South Africa
a step further by exploring the aspect of person-to-person communication at the lowest level. This
will be done by assessing the role of the DLCs, which are instruments of grassroots diplomacy, in
border relations between Lesotho and South Africa.
There are ten DLCs all together, but for the purpose of this research,  two will be used as case
studies. These are the Maseru/Ladybrand DLC and the Qacha’s Nek/Matatiele DLC. The two case
studies are an attempt to  compare the performance of the two DLCs in different areas. The
Maseru/Ladybrand DLC consists of urban communities which have a different way of looking at
things from the Qacha’s Nek/Matatiele DLC. The problem of stock-theft is not as major as it is in the
Qacha’s Nek/Matatiele area, so they can afford to have a broader agenda. The Maseru/Ladybrand
4DLC falls within the Lesotho/Free State border areas. It has also been operating for a longer period
of time than the Qacha’s Nek/Matatiele DLC.
The Qacha’s Nek/Matatiele area on the other hand is the most troubled area as far as stock-theft is
concerned. A large number of people have been killed during  stock raids. Stock-theft in this area is
a highly organised criminal activity with the use of deadly weapons such as the AK 47 (Cronje, 1998).
Therefore, overcoming this problem and normalising  relations are the number one priorities on their
agenda. The high crime rate and conspiracy in this area are hindering the progress of the DLC. This
DLC is the newest of all the DLCs, since it was only established after the 1994 South African
election. It falls within the Lesotho/Transkei border area.
1.4   Method
This research relies mainly  on the secondary sources. Government reports from the Foreign Ministry
in Lesotho and the South African High Commission in Maseru will be extensively used. Additional
materials  consist of journals, information from the Internet and newspaper articles. Open  interviews
were also  carried out with some of the key people in the DLCs.
 1.5  Structure of the Thesis
The paper is divided into six chapters. The first chapter is the introduction. Chapter Two looks at
some of the conventional diplomatic methods used to deal with  border disputes on the African
continent.   A few examples of such conflicts on the African continent are examined. The Chapter sets
out to do three things. Firstly, it establishes that border conflict is not unique to Lesotho and South
Africa. Secondly, it attempts to show that ways of solving  border disputes have not always worked.
Finally, the chapter argues the case for grassroots diplomacy as an alternative to orthodox diplomacy.
The third chapter  gives a brief historical background to Lesotho/South African border relations. It
briefly discusses how the present Lesotho borders came into being. It is an attempt to show how the
changing borders contributed toward the present character of border relations between the two
5countries. It attempts to show how the historical emergence of the present Lesotho borders left the
door open for perpetual border conflict between Lesotho and South Africa. 
Chapter Four provides policy frameworks for the resolution of conflicts between the two countries
during  different periods. Four periods are identified.  The first period  from 1966 to 1970,  when the
government of Lesotho pursued a policy of dialogue with South Africa. The second period  from
1972 to 1980, it is argued, was characterised  by  confrontation and conflict. The third period,  from
1980 to 1985  was characterised by the introduction of the Inter-governmental Liaison committee.
Finally, the fifth period  from 1985  to date is characterised by the establishment of the DLCs as
instruments of grassroots diplomacy.  
 
Chapter Five is an analysis of the performance of  the DLCs.  Our two case studies, namely, the
Maseru/Ladybrand and the Qacha’s Nek/Matatiele DLCs will be analysed. The chapter will also
assess how the changes in  post-apartheid South Africa are likely to change the relations between
Lesotho and South Africa, at grassroots levels.  
The concluding chapter constitutes a summary of all the chapters. It draws a conclusion about the
mediating role of the DLCs in  relations between Lesotho and South Africa.  It also looks at how  the
DLCs can be strengthened.
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7CHAPTER 2
2. BORDER CONFLICTS IN AFRICA AND HOW THEY ARE DEALT WITH
2.1  Introduction
Border conflicts are not unique to Lesotho and South Africa. Many countries  have been involved in
border conflicts with their neighbours at one stage or another. The most common cause of border
conflict is the issue of boundaries.  Boundaries which are not clearly defined have resulted in
confrontations between countries all over the world. For example, boundaries are  the main cause of
the Indian/Pakistani conflict which has been going on for decades. At the end of the day, the cause
of conflict boils down to who controls what part of the territory. Besides wars, border conflicts have
manifested themselves in many different ways, including cattle rustling and poaching. The nationals
of one country cross into a neighbouring  country to try and steal livestock and carry out some illegal
poaching activities, because they claim that they have a right to that part of the territory and that it
is historically theirs. 
This chapter looks at some of the conventional diplomatic methods which are employed to deal with
border conflicts on the African continent. Three  examples of border conflicts  between neighbouring
countries in Africa are examined. The aim of this chapter is to show that top-bottom conventional
diplomacy does not always work. It argues the case for   grassroots diplomacy as an alternative  to
orthodox diplomacy.
2.2 Colonialism and its Impact on Border Relations in Africa
The most common cause of border conflicts in Africa is the colonial boundaries.  It is therefore,
important to show how colonialism impacted on  border relations on the continent. When Africa was
partitioned into colonial territories, the Africans were not consulted by the colonisers. The political
map of Africa was shaped to suit the interests of the colonising powers. The colonising powers did
not consider the importance of the cultural homogeneity of ethnic groups in those territories. As a
result, colonial boundaries often divided closely related peoples. For example, the Maasai were
divided between Kenya and Tanzania. The Venda were divided between South Africa and Zimbabwe.
8The Kongo-speaking peoples were dispersed over three states of Congo, Zaire and Angola and these
territories belonged to three different colonial powers (Fowler, 1995:10; Randrianja, 1996:24).
The dispersing of groups over a number of different states has affected relations between those states
in the post-colonial period.   Strained relations have continued to characterise interactions among
those states because of competing claims to territories and people.  Examples of such cases include
South Africa and Botswana over the control of the Tswana; Ghana and Togo over the control of the
Ewe; Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia over the Somali; Senegal and Gambia over the Wolof.  Falola
(1996:10) argues that as long as different countries pursue policies that disregard the fact that these
groups were previously members of the same ‘nations’, frontier tensions will continue. 
     
At the same time, colonial boundaries have brought together different ethnic groups with very few
common interests. As a result, the governments which succeeded the colonialists were/are faced with
the difficult task of managing these groups within common boundaries.  For example, in countries like
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Namibia, rebel groups are defying the central
authorities or seeking a degree of autonomy for the areas they control (Drame, 1996: 201-202).
Colonial boundaries in the case of Rwanda have brought together two groups which do not get along
very well.  The coming together of these two hostile groups  have resulted in the worst case of
genocide where the Tutsis were   nearly wiped out by the Hutus. 
2.3  Africans’ Reaction to Colonial Borders
The arbitrariness with which Africa’s national boundaries were drawn during the colonial period
called for some serious discussions in the 1950s. Some African leaders expressed concern that
decolonization of other territories could lead to the “compartmentalization of the continent into as
many as fifty sovereign nations, more than twice as many as in Latin America” (Mukisa, 1997: 7).
Indeed, in 1996, there were 53 states on the continent.
Even though some African leaders recognised the disruptive potential of the colonial boundaries, they
were maintained because they feared the chaos that widespread boundary changes might cause. They
9were also aware that dramatic changes in the inherited state system could be particularly disastrous
to those who succeeded the colonialists (Herbst, 1992:105).
President Kwame Nkurumah of Ghana, who was one of the first African leaders to recognise the
disruptive potential of the colonial boundaries, championed a movement  towards African unity. He
and his colleagues organised a number of Pan-African conferences which led to the creation of the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 (Mukisa, 1997: 7). The subject of colonial boundaries
came up frequently during these Pan-African conferences and the OAU summit meetings. The
greatest fear of the founding fathers was that since most African frontiers divided ethnic groups, “to
concede to the demands of one dissatisfied group would open a Pandora’s box of similar demands
elsewhere” (Mayall, 1991:25). As a result, at the 1963 meeting of the OAU, which was held in Addis
Ababa, the main concern of the African leaders was to protect the boundaries they had inherited from
their colonial masters.
When dealing with border and territorial conflicts among African states, three principles were
recognised by the OAU in order to regulate inter-African affairs. The first one was the inviolability
of the inherited colonially-imposed borders. The second one was non-interference in the internal
affairs of the member states. Lastly, the settlement of such disputes was to be carried out by means
of  mediation, conciliation and arbitration (Sesay, 1982:186).
The OAU Charter urges members to settle their disputes peacefully through mediation, conciliation
and arbitration. The rationale behind this charter provision was that “given the newness of
independence and the arbitrary nature of most African borders and boundaries, order and peace could
not be maintained on the continent if African states resorted to force in their relations with each
other” (Sesay, 1982:170).
The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration which was set up by the OAU in 1963
was not very successful in settling territorial conflicts among African states. It remained unutilised
for twelve years after its establishment. This was because it  lacked the power to  institute mandatory
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sanctions. Indeed there are a number of cases which demonstrate that the OAU failed in its mediating
role. Shortly after its formation, the OAU was confronted with a series of boundary and territorial
disputes. These included quarrels between Ghana and Upper Volta, Somalia and Kenya, Somalia and
Ethiopia and  Algeria and Morocco. They all took place between 1963 and 1964. The OAU was not
utilised in all these cases.   This shows that the member states were not motivated to take their
disputes to the commission for arbitration or mediation.
Two conventional diplomatic methods of dealing with border conflicts on the African continent have
been identified and they are the OAU’s Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, and
presidential mediation. In fact, most countries opted for presidential mediation rather than make use
of this OAU commission . In most cases, the OAU’s role has been reduced to merely rubber stamping
the agreements reached through the  personal initiatives of the African leaders (Sesay, 1982:187-188).
In the case of presidential mediation,  African leaders offer their diplomatic services to their friends
in times of trouble. They act as mediators to bring warring parties to the negotiations table. These
mediators are willing to devote a lot of time, and sometimes even resources to bring  conflicts either
to a peaceful conclusion or to a dormant stage until a formula is found for a lasting solution. For
example, the late William Tolbert of Liberia successfully reconciled Guinea-Ivory Coast and Guinea-
Senegal in 1975. Tubman, also of Liberia, undertook a number of diplomatic moves aimed at settling
the Nigeria-Biafra war in the late 1960s (Sesay, 1982: 189).
The top-bottom conventional diplomatic methods have not always been successful in solving border
conflicts.  The OAU has failed because African states have no faith in it. It is more of a talk shop than
anything else. It lacks the power to institute mandatory sanctions. It is interested in protecting the
colonial boundaries which are the very source of border conflicts. Presidential mediation in most cases
have only succeeded in bringing short term solutions to the problems. The shortcomings of these
conventional diplomatic methods will be further discussed in the specific case studies below.
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2.4 The Case Studies
This section deals with specific cases of cross-border conflict and the approaches which have been
used to handle them.  The aim of these case studies is to show the weaknesses of some of these
diplomatic approaches which are adopted when dealing with conflicts between neighbouring
countries. There are many such cases on the African continent, but for the purpose of this paper, only
three will be critically analysed. These are the Eritrean/Ethiopian conflict, the Eritrean/Sudanese
conflict, and the Botswana/Namibian conflict.
 
i) The Eritrean/Ethiopian Conflict
Eritrea and Ethiopia are situated in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia has never been colonised. Eritrea like
most of today’s African states, was a creation of colonial history. It was colonised by the Italians in
the 1890s.  The boundary between the two countries had been agreed upon between the Italians and
Emperor Menelik of Ethiopia by means of a treaty in 1889 (Selassie, 1989: 106).  This boundary has
been verified in several international agreements in the post-1896 period, including the 1902 treaty.
The British took over the control of Eritrea in 1941 after the defeat of the Italians by the allied forces
in the Second World War. In 1952, the two countries of Eritrea and Ethiopia were joined together
under a federation arrangement. Eritrea got its independence from Ethiopia in 1993, after a long
process of struggle for secession. Since its independence, the definition of its international borders
have been of utmost importance to the Eritrean government. Hence, the Eritrean government have
been involved in  border conflicts with a number of  its neighbours.
Eritrea and Ethiopia experienced armed conflict in May-June 1998. The quarrel was about the exact
location of the 1000km common border (Esterhuysen, 1998: 90). The border conflict between
Eritrea and Ethiopia had been brewing for a long time. In 1902 when the boundary was verified, the
Badme area was not occupied. During the last few decades, the region has become increasingly
populated by peasants from the Eritrean and Tigrayan high plateaux and Kunana villages. After the
federation of Eritrea and Ethiopia in 1952, the Lord of Tigray, Ras Mengesha, developed agricultural
estates along the frontier. These agricultural estates were administered by the Tigray district of Shire.
The area has been subjected to periodic disputes since that time. For example, in 1976 and 1981 the
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guerillas of the Eritrean Liberation Font (ELF) and those of the Tigrayan Peoples Liberation Front
(TPLF) clashed with each other in the area. The clashes never became serious because they were
allies against a common enemy, which was the then Ethiopian regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam. The
Mengistu regime had complicated the matter further when it changed the administrative borders in
1987. When the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) took over control of the Eritrean
resistance movement, this dispute was shelved provisionally (P`eninou, 1998: 507). 
When Eritrea got its independence in 1993, a bilateral commission was set up to define the border
between the two countries. The commission hardly got beyond listing the points of dispute,  before
the border war broke out between the two countries. The principal disputed areas along the Eritrean-
Ethiopian border seem to be on the Ethiopian side and are claimed by the Eritreans. These areas are
the Yirga Triangle which includes the villages of Badime and Shiraro, along with several areas to the
east of the border post. There is also Zalambessa on the main road between the capitals of the two
countries and an area in the far south, opposite the port of Assab. On the 12th of May 1998, Eritrean
soldiers occupied the Yirga Triangle and several people were killed in the cross-fire which resulted
from that occupation (Esterhuysen, 1998: 90).
The dispute has been the subject of intense debate.  Ragnhild Ek (1998: 509) suggested a border
dispute and speculations about economic agendas and different internal problems as the reasons
behind the conflict. Lionel Cliff (1998: 516-517)  argues that the conflict was not about the real
international border between the two. Rather, it was about the problem of two definitions. The first
one is an international colonial definition while the other is of various administrative arrangements
that have changed over various periods.
Since the declaration of war, quite a number of countries have offered the services of their offices to
mediate in this conflict. The United States with the support of Rwanda, Djibouti and Lybia acted as
mediators. The compromise which they proposed suggested that ‘Eritrea should retreat from  its
position on the 6th May while further discussions on the borders based on the colonial demarcation
took place’ (P`eninou, 1998: 506). Their mediation did not help because Ethiopia on the one hand
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demanded the unconditional withdrawal of Eritrean troops from its territory. Eritrea on the other
hand denied that its forces had occupied  territory which did not belong to it (Esterhysen, 1998: 90-
91). Both the Eritrean President and the Ethiopian Prime Minister were not prepared to lose face
before the United States. Once the war was declared, they were not ready to lose face before their
respective public.  Many other countries also offered their diplomatic services in order to bring peace
to the region. These included countries like Italy, Egypt, Zimbabwe,  Netherlands and the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) (P`eninou, 1998: 506).
On the 15th June 1998,  Italian diplomacy managed to secure a cease-fire in aerial attacks, but the
Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was tempted to reconquer Assab and the Eritrean Dankalia
in order to gain the support of the opposition after the humiliating military defeats.  The position of
the Ethiopian Prime Minister was very fragile. He had lost the support of many people. His position
required the mediators to press for a  solution which would not lead to the downfall of his regime in
Addis Ababa (Peninou, 1998: 506). 
On the 26th June 1998, the United Nations Security Council voted unanimously to call on the two
governments to immediately cease hostilities. Both sides welcomed the Security Council resolution,
but still they continued to build up military forces on the front line. The world was surprised by the
lack of will on the part of both governments to find a negotiated solutions (Esterhuysen, 1998: 91).
This is a clear example of a failure of conventional diplomacy, where both parties opted for war to
solve their problems without exhausting all the diplomatic means available.
The OAU established a mediation committee in June 1998, in an attempt to end the dispute. In July
1998, an OAU delegation visited the two countries. The committee presented  its report to the
Ethiopian and Eritrean Ministers of Foreign Affairs at a meeting held in Ougadougou, Burkina Faso,
in August 1998. In November 1998, the OAU  presented  peace proposals which endorsed the US-
Rwandan peace plan to both countries. This goes to prove the point raised above that the OAU’s role
has been reduced to role of rubber-stamping the decisions reached within Presidential mediation.
Ethiopia agreed to the framework almost immediately. Eritrea  rejected a clause demanding a
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unilateral withdrawal of its troops from the contested area to allow Ethiopia to return to the region
it controlled before May 1998. 
Other international mediation attempts continued in the late 1998. These included that of Anthony
Lake, a former US national security adviser. They all failed to resolve the dispute. Eritrea requested
an urgent Security Council meeting to “condemn Ethiopia’s territorial ambitions and aggression
against Eritrea”(President Isaias Afewerki’s words when requesting an urgent Security Council
meeting). The meeting was held on Saturday the 27th February 1999. At this meeting, Eritrea finally
agreed to accept an international proposal for peace with Ethiopia. The Security Council demanded
an immediate halt to all hostilities, welcomed  Eritrea’s decision and supported the peace efforts by
the OAU. The Security Council resolutions  demanded  an  immediate cease-fire and a halt to arms
sales to both countries (http://cnn.com/world/africa/a902/27/ethiopia. eritrea.01/: 27th February).
All the diplomatic approaches to handling conflict which have been mentioned in the first part of the
chapter have been tried in this case. They have not yet come up with a permanent solution to the
conflict. When one examines all the factors surrounding this conflict, it need not have led to war
because there does not seem to be a real conflict with regard to  where the real boundary, as drawn
up by the Italians and the Ethiopian Empire, is.  The misunderstandings could have been easily dealt
with through negotiations. The biggest problem is that it seems as though neither of the leaders of
these two countries are willing to back down.  This conflict is threatening the stability of the whole
of the Horn of Africa.  
A lesson one can learn from this case study is that politicians are not always the best people to handle
conflict because sometimes they can use the situation to pursue their own selfish political interests
without considering the consequences the conflict might have for everybody else. In all the
approaches which have been used in this case, there is none where the people in the affected area have
been asked what they think is best for them as the most  affected by the conflict. It is therefore
necessary to involve the grassroots when making decisions which will affect them.
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ii) Eritrean-Sudanese Conflict
The Republic of Sudan lies in the north-eastern Africa. It is bordered by Egypt to the north, by the
Red Sea, Eritrea and Ethiopia to the east, by the Central African Republic, Chad and Libya to the
west, and by Kenya, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to the South (The
Europa World Year Book 1999, Vol.II: 3300). The Sudanese government has been a cause for great
concern to all its neighbours because of its support of  Islamic fundamentalism. It has clashed with
all of them at one stage or another.
Before 1989 Eritrea and Sudan enjoyed good relations. The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front
(EPLF) enjoyed Sudanese hospitality during their struggle for independence from Ethiopia. Trouble
between the two countries started  in 1989 when the National Islamic Front (NIF) in Sudan
reportedly sponsored the creation of the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM). In 1992, the
provisional government of Eritrea complained that its forces had fought against the Jihad infiltrators
from Sudan. Following that incident, the Eritrean government took the first step towards peaceful
settlement of the problem. They sent several delegations to Khartoum and managed to convince the
Sudanese government to stop the activities of the EIJM. This eased the tension between these two
countries for some time (Tekle, 1996: 505). However, the negotiations  between the two
governments only brought about a short term solution.
In August 1994, Eritrea and Sudan signed an agreement concerning borders, security and repatriation
of refugees. In November, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) initiated a repatriation programme for the Eritreans who were currently in Sudan. Some
500,000 Eritreans had taken refuge in Sudan in the early 1990s during the struggle for independence.
Only a small portion of them returned after independence (The Europa World Year Book 1999,
Vol.1: 1308).
   
Relations between the two deteriorated in November 1994, when the Eritrean authorities accused
Sudan of training 400 terrorists since August 1994. Sudan accused Eritrea of training some 3000
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Sudanese rebels in camps within Eritrea.  In December 1994, Eritrea severed diplomatic relations with
Sudan and threatened  all-out war (The Europa World Year Book 1999, Vol. 1: 1308).
The early1995  attacks and infiltrations by commandos of the military wing of EIJM in Barka
Province  provoked further destabilisation. The Eritrean authorities subsequently claimed to have
identified six training camps on the Sudanese side of the border. They also claimed that large numbers
of Eritrean refugees in Sudan had been arrested by Sudanese security forces (The Europa World Year
Book 1999, Vol 1: 1308). 
Eritrea  hosted a meeting of Sudanese opposition groups in Asmara in January 1995. At this meeting
they sought to forge cooperation in their efforts to overthrow the regime in Khartoum, and form the
National Democratic Alliance (NDA).  The Eritrean President, Isaias Afewerki publicly promised to
supply the NDA with arms. According to Tekle (1996:505-506)  , this was a declaration by the
Eritrean government that toppling of the Sudanese government was a matter of extreme national
interest. In turn, the Sudanese government  accused Eritrea of violating the OAU Charter by
interfering in the internal affairs of a  member state. The Sudanese government also complained that
the Eritrean President’s statement was tantamount to an act of war and Eritrea should be held
responsible for it. 
The OAU offered to act as mediators, but Eritrea rejected the offer. In his response to the offer, the
Eritrean Foreign Minister actually declared that the Eritrean  government did not believe in the
effectiveness of the OAU’s mechanism for conflict prevention and management. Instead, Eritrea
opted for the Inter-Governmental Authority for Drought and Development (IGADD) (Tekle, 1996:
506).  This shows how much faith Eritrea had lost  in the OAU’s ability to settle conflicts amongst
member states. Eritrea was  arrogant and dismissive in the way it responded to the OAU’s offer to
mediate in this conflict.  The arrogance of the Eritrean politicians made it impossible for the OAU to
contribute towards solving of the problem. 
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Between 1996 and 1998, there have been several cases of attacks against each other which have been
reported. In April 1996, the EIJM claimed responsibility for several attacks on Eritrean government
vehicles. In January 1997, Sudan accused Eritrean troops of launching an attack on Sudanese  forces
in the frontier region. In this attack, there had been numerous casualties. In May, Sudan closed its
border temporarily because of the fear that Eritrea was going to attack. At the same time, the Eritrean
security forces announced that they had discovered a plot to assassinate the Eritrean President by the
Sudanese government. Eritrea also complained about repeated violations of its airspace by Sudanese
aircraft. In February 1998 Sudan once again closed the border with Eritrea in an attempt to prevent
incursions into Sudan. During 1998, further attacks on Sudanese forces by the Eritrean troops were
reported. In October 1998, the Foreign Ministers of the two countries attended a mediation meeting
in Qatar. At the end of the meeting, they signed a memorandum of understanding to normalise
relations (The Europa World Year Book 1999, Vol. 1: 1308). 
The failure of the involved parties to reach a peaceful settlement to the problem has opened the doors
for future conflict, especially because  diplomatic relations between the two have been severed.
Despite the memorandum of understanding signed by the Foreign Ministers of the two countries,
there is still a lot of tension at the border.  One lesson which can be learned from this case is that the
personalities of the politicians involved in the diplomacy processes can stand in the way of peace. The
arrogance of politicians can actually bring their countries down. Conventional diplomacy does not
seem to be succeeding in the case of these two countries. The two countries need to approach their
problems in a different way. Perhaps new players in the negotiation process have to be engaged.
 iii)  Botswana-Namibia Conflict
Botswana is located in the heart of Southern Africa. It is a large land locked country bordered on the
south by the Republic of South Africa, on the west and northwest by Namibia, on the north by
Zambia, and on the northeast by Zimbabwe.  It was declared a British protectorate in 1885 and it got
its independence in 1966  (Vengroff,1977:13).
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In July 1992, a border dispute developed between Botswana and Namibia regarding their rival
territorial claims  over Sedudu/Kasikili Island in the Chobe river. The dispute assumed the form of
poaching in the island. The people who were involved in the poaching activities were from the Caprivi
in Namibia and other countries such as Angola, Zambia and Zimbabwe. By the mid-1980s, the anti-
poaching patrols which were organised by the Department of Wildlife and National Parks in
Botswana were increasingly placed at risk because the poachers had resorted to the use of
sophisticated weapons.  The Botswana government responded by deploying Botswana Defence Force
(BDF) personnel on the island in 1987, as they had the capacity to match the weapons and tactics of
the poachers (BOPA,1999: I). 
Sedudu Island formed an important part of the Chobe Game Reserve which  was established in 1960
and later, of the Chobe National Park which was created in 1967.  The wild species are endangered
by the activities of the poachers. Their survival depends on the anti-poaching patrols of the Botswana
authorities. Between 1990 to the beginning of 1999, a total of 75 poaching incidents had been
recorded by BDF, in which species such as elephant, rhino, leopard, buffalo and zebra were killed.
The South African army also played a big role in destroying  wildlife in Caprivi by systematic
slaughter while they occupied  Namibia before it got its independence (BOPA,1999: 1). 
The Namibians want control of the island. The Botswana authorities are afraid that if Namibia is given
control of the island, the poachers will destroy wildlife on the Botswana side as well. The Botswana
government want both countries to continue to have access to the island.
In early 1995, the two states agreed to present the issue of the demarcation of their joint border for
arbitration at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In February 1996 the two countries signed an
agreement committing themselves in advance, to the court’s eventual judgement. Meanwhile, Namibia
appealed to Botswana to remove its troops and national flag from the island. In the following month,
the two countries agreed on the joint measures aimed at deterring smuggling and illegal border
crossings ( The Europa World Year  Book 1999, Vol.1: 697 ). 
19
None the less, Botswana’s completion of a new air base in 1995 and the efforts to procure military
tanks threatened Namibia and it has remained a source of conflict between the two. Namibia
perceived it as attempts by Botswana to extend the role and capacities of its armed forces in the area.
Botswana emphasized that the principal aim of such expansion was purely to enable its military to
fulfil a wider regional and international peace-keeping role (The Europa Year Book 1999, Vol.1:
697).
In 1996-97, the Namibian government decided to construct a pipeline to take water from Okavango
River. This construction was a source of great concern in Botswana itself. The Okavango River feeds
the Okavango delta which is an important habitat for Botswana’s varied wildlife (The Europa Year
Book 1999, Vol.1: 697).
In early 1997, it was reported that Namibia had been angered by Botswana’s erection of a fence along
the Caprivi Strip. This fence separates the two countries to the north. Botswana insisted that the fence
was a measure to control the spread of livestock diseases (The Europa Year Book 1999, Vol.1: 697).
In January 1998, an emergency meeting of Botswana-Namibia Joint Commission on Defence and
Security was held to discuss ownership of another island in the Chobe river called Situngu. This
meeting followed allegations by Namibia that the BDF had occupied the island and was stealing crops
planted by the Namibian farmers resident there. Representatives from both countries recommended
that a joint technical commission  be set up to demarcate the joint  border. The discussions regarding
its establishment took place in mid-May, 1998 (The Europa Year Book 1999, Vol.1: 697-698).
On the 9th April 1998, President Mogae of Botswana complained that  Namibian troops had illegally
entered Botswana twice in two weeks. He said  Namibian troops had patrolled twenty yards along
the disease control fence inside Botswana and the Botswana government was treating the incident
seriously. Botswana and Namibia have held talks over long-running local border disputes between
the two (http://www.japan.cnn.com/WORLD/africa/9804/09/ rb001201. reut.html.9 April,1999).
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The case of Botswana and Namibia is still under review by the  ICJ. The two countries are asking the
ICJ to “determine on the basis of the Anglo-German Treaty of 1 July 1890 and the principles of
international law, the boundary between  Namibia and Botswana around Kasikili/Sedudu Island and
the legal status of the island”. (BOPA, 1999 : 5).
The border was fixed by the Anglo-German Treaty of July1, 1890. Article III(2) of the Treaty is
relevant to the Sedudu case. The article places the boundary between Botswana and Namibia in the
Chobe River in the “... centre of the main channel of the river to its junction with the Zambezi, where
it terminates”. (Anglo-German Treaty as quoted in Botswana Daily News,  16 February,1999.No 31).
When presenting their case to the ICJ, the Namibians accused the Botswana Defence Force (BDF)
of murder, violence and harassment of the people of the Caprivi region. Namibia claimed that
Botswana’s occupation of that island was illegal. According to the argument put before the ICJ by
Dr Kawana of Namibia, Botswana’s  territorial ambitions in the area date back to 1963 when a
member of the Bechuanaland Legislative Council moved a motion asking the Council to take
complete control of the Caprivi Strip. Although the motion was defeated, this ambition was repeated
in 1965 by the then Deputy Prime Minister Ketumile Masire. Dr Kawana  argued that the BDF
occupied Sedudu Island in 1991, when Masire was President of Botswana (BOPA, 1999: 5).   
The Namibian argument is that Kasikili Island has always been part of Namibia and will remain  part
of Namibia. It was occupied by the Masubia people for over one hundred years. They also argued that
the “Anglo-German Treaty of 1890, properly interpreted, attributes the island to Namibia because
the main channel of the Chobe River in the vicinity of the island is the southern channel and the treaty
established the boundary as the centre of the main channel” (BOPA, 1999: 5).
When the turn of Botswana came to put forward  their arguments to the ICJ, they argued that “the
boundary between Botswana and Namibia was established on the basis of Article II of the Anglo-
American (sic) Agreement of 1890. The Agreement states where the river bifurcates, the boundary
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follows the main channel” (Mphusu, 1999: 1). According to them, the northern channel is the main
channel.
Contrary to Namibia’s allegation of BDF harassment and the killing of Namibians on the eastern
Caprivi, Botswana claimed that they have recently received close to 2000 Namibians from that region
fleeing from harassment by security forces and political differences. They claim that the BDF were
deployed on Sedudu Island in 1987 as an anti-poaching measure and not in 1991 as alleged by
Namibia. The continued presence of the BDF was jointly approved by the presidents of Botswana,
Namibia and Zimbabwe at the Kasane Summit on the 24 May, 1992. The BDF is just assisting the
Department of Wildlife and National Parks in anti-poaching activities, because poachers have resorted
to sophisticated weapons (Mphusu, 1999: 1).
In this case, the two countries have not exhausted all the available diplomatic means to deal with the
border conflict. From the onset, they decided to take the case to the ICJ. It looks like the two
countries do not have faith in their own local resources to deal with the conflict effectively. What is
obvious in this case is the differences between the two government in their approach to nature
preservation. The Botswana government  is keen to preserve wild life, while the Namibian
government  does not give wildlife preservation  first priority. The fact that the Namibian government
had not taken powerful measures to bring an end to the poaching activities, as the Botswana
government did, to the extend that the Namibian side of the border has been cleared of all wildlife by
the poachers shows that the former does not give wild life preservation a first priority.   If the two
governments could harmonise their policies on wildlife preservation, I do not think there would even
be a need to argue about the exact location of the boundary. Both countries could use the island for
their wildlife. 
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2.5  Conclusion
The chapter has demonstrated  that border conflicts are indeed not unique to Lesotho and South
Africa.  In fact, border conflicts in Africa are endemic. The bulk of the blame has to be put on
colonialism. The selfish way in which the colonialist drew the boundaries throughout the continent
without considering the interests of the African people has created many problems for the continent
as a whole. Many border conflicts have broken out in the post-colonial period. 
Two conventional methods of handling cross border conflict have been picked out and these are the
OAU’s committee of Mediation and Conciliation and the presidential mediation. The OAU provided
a forum where members could take their cases for arbitration and mediation. This has not been
utilised because it  lacked the power to enforce mandatory sanctions. The African countries are
reluctant to take their cases to the OAU for arbitration. The case studies have confirmed that African
countries do not have faith in the OAU as a mediator in their conflicts with their neighbours.
Another diplomatic forum which most countries opted for to settle their border disputes was
presidential mediation. This form of mediation has been more successful than the former. It has
overshadowed the former  in the sense that the former slowly became the rubber stamp of the
decisions taken by the latter form of mediation. This latter form of diplomacy has not been successful
in all cases. In most cases, it has only brought about short term solutions. Over the years, the African
continent has been plunged into a series of wars caused by border conflicts, despite the mediation
efforts by leaders of different states. 
It has became clear that the top-bottom diplomatic approach to border conflicts has failed to bring
permanent solutions in most cases. This top-bottom approach to border conflicts is failing because
of various reasons. The above examples of conflicts have identified some of the weaknesses of top-
bottom diplomacy which make it unsuccessful. One of the reasons is that   politicians can stand in the
way of peace. They sometimes use a problem to pursue their own selfish political interests.
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The states involved in conflicts have failed to make use of all the available local resources in their
attempts to resolve their conflicts with their neighbours. For example, not all the parties affected by
the conflict are involved in the negotiation process. People at grassroots levels have not been involved
in most of these cases. The decisions reached through these other means of diplomacy are detached
from the situations on the ground. These states have not incorporated the input of the  grassroots in
the peace process. Therefore, the failure of the top-bottom approach calls for consideration of an
alternative diplomatic means of dealing with cross-border conflict.
Hence, this  study proposes to investigate the prospects of grassroots diplomacy as an  alternative
to top-bottom conventional diplomacy.  Lesotho and South Africa have institutionalised the
resolution of border conflicts at grassroots levels through the establishment of the DLCs. This was
done in an attempt to improve border relations between the two countries. This study of grassroots
diplomacy between Lesotho and South Africa is therefore, an attempt to see how the involvement
of people at grassroots level has affected border relations between the two countries. Before going
into grassroots diplomacy, this paper will give a historical background to the practice of grassroots
diplomacy and this will be done in the following chapter.      
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CHAPTER 3
3. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF LESOTHO/SOUTH AFRICA BORDER RELATIONS
3.1 Introduction
The last chapter dealt with border conflicts in the African continent.  Some of the conventional
diplomatic methods which are used to solve the border conflicts have been assessed. The chapter has
shown that there is general failure of top-bottom diplomacy in dealing with border conflicts.  This
chapter gives a historical background to Lesotho/South Africa border relations.  It is an attempt to
show how the historical emergence of the present Lesotho borders left the doors open for perpetual
border conflict between Lesotho and South Africa.
3.2 The Changing Borders and Cross-Border Stock Theft
Modern  Lesotho like the rest of the African countries is a product of colonialism. Lesotho  is a small
country with an area of 11,716 square miles. It is situated in Southern Africa and it is completely
surrounded by South Africa. It is one of the only two countries (which include San Marino) in the
world which are completely enveloped by another country. It is bounded by the Drakensberg
mountains on the south and north-east, the flat plains of the Orange Free State on the west and
Eastern Cape to the south and south-west  (Spence,1968: 5).  Lesotho has a population of about two
million people.  There are more Basotho in South Africa than in Lesotho itself and this, like in most
African countries, was a result of the colonial boundaries which cut across the Basotho nation.
Lesotho’s boundaries were shaped to suit the interests of the Afrikaner and the British.  The Basotho
lost a large portion of their arable land to the Afrikaner farmers. They were left with a territory, two
thirds of which consisted of mountains. Only thirteen percent of the land is arable. The loss of
territory went hand in hand with the loss of a certain portion of Basotho population. The loss of this
land is very much resented by the Basotho. Over the years, this resentment has been expressed in the
form of  stock theft and this practise has continued till to date. The police research conducted during
1998 has confirmed that there is a general feeling among the  Basotho living along the border that
‘taking’ stock from the South African side which used to be part of Lesotho was not stealing but
simply taking what was rightfully theirs (Jonker and Monane, 1998). 
27
    
The migration of the Afrikaner farmers into the Orange Free State marked the beginning of border
conflicts  between Lesotho and South Africa. They crossed the Orange River from 1833 onwards.
They had reached the land of Basotho by 1843. When the Afrikaners interacted with the Basotho,
conflict was inevitable  because the two groups did not have the same understanding of the nature
of land ownership.  Moshoeshoe, the King  of the Basotho, only gave permission to the Afrikaner
farmers to graze their cattle on the land traditionally used by Basotho on a temporary basis. It is
argued that when Moshoeshoe gave the white farmers access to land, he had in mind the spirit in
which he had received similar requests from African families after Lifaqane wars. They were  suppose
to be under his  sovereign.  In Basotho culture, land was owned by the whole community and
distributed by the chief among his people for their  use. It is ‘inalienable and pasturage communal’
(Kimble,1978: 92 ). So, as far as the Basotho were concerned, the land which was occupied by the
Afrikaners was still the community property of the Basotho.  
On the other hand, for the Afrikaners, “individual title to land was a clear and unambiguous concept
which could be formalised in the boundary lines” (Spence, 1968: 10). They insisted on exclusive
occupation of any land they settled on. They, also, demanded  delimitation of grazing boundaries and
the recognition of the rights of private property of land (Kimble,1978: 92).
Due to this different understanding of land ownership, the two communities were bound to have
clashes over land. Clashes took the form of cattle theft. The Afrikaners were coming up with new
concepts the Basotho had never heard of before. The Basotho did not recognise private land
ownership and they constantly violated what the Afrikaners regarded as ‘private property’. In the
opinion of the Afrikaners, there was a need for boundaries to be drawn to divide the two groups so
that each group could exercise the land ownership according to their own  understanding of it. As far
as Basotho were concerned, there was no need for boundary lines to be drawn because they had no
doubt in their minds that the land was theirs.  As a result, Basotho were constantly “violating” private
property and the Afrikaners regarded this as an act of violence.
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The Afrikaners and Basotho could not see eye to eye  on the issue of land. As the number of the
Afrikaners increased, they became more aggressive and openly challenged the authorities of the
African leaders in the area. They began competing with the African leaders over land claims. This
competition was expressed in the form of cattle raiding.   The situation in the area was deteriorating
very fast. Therefore, external intervention was sought. 
Moshoeshoe was advised by the missionaries to seek British assistance in 1842. The British
recognised all Moshoeshoe’s claims to the land “extending from the confluence of the Caledon and
Orange Rivers and following a line 25 to 30 miles west of the Caledon all the way to the north where
it met the territory of the Tlokoa” (see Figure 1) (Gill, 1993: 89).  This was formalised by the Napier
treaty which was signed in 1843. The Napier Treaty was the first in a series of agreements concluded
between the British Government and the Basotho. Its aim was to establish a tenable and final
boundary for Moshoeshoe’s territory.
The Napier settlement did not bring lasting peace to the border disputes between the Basotho and the
Afrikaner farmers because of complaints raised by other groups in the area. These groups claimed to
be independent from Moshoeshoe and demanded to be treated as such. As a result,  there was nothing
much the British could do and the Afrikaner farmers, therefore, continued to creep into the land of
Basotho.
The Basotho resented the invasion of their land by the Afrikaners.  There was constant violation of
the Napier line by the Basotho. Those living along the borders organised themselves into raiding
parties. They raided the white farms as a way of showing their resentment of the encroachment upon
their land by the Afrikaner farmers. For example, Moshoeshoe’s brother, Posholi occupied the
mountain of Vechtkop for the soul purpose of raiding white farmers who persisted in occupying land
east of the line between the Kraai River and Commissie Drift (Thompson, 1975: 139). They stole
cattle and horses from the Afrikaner farms.
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In 1849, the British drew a new boundary line. As indicated in Figure 1, the new boundary took away
much of Moshoeshoe’s land in the west and south (Sanders, 1975: 94).  The districts which were
declared Basotho territory by this boundary  were Zastron, Wepener, Ladybrand, Ficksburg and
Foriesburg (Eloff,1979:9). The boundary was called the Warden line. The Basotho were not happy
with the Warden line, but Moshoeshoe accepted it to avoid alienating the British. Moshoeshoe
resorted to diplomacy to resolve border conflicts. Most of the Basotho were getting tired of
Moshoeshoe’s diplomatic ways. There was constant violation of the boundary line by Basotho who
felt cheated by the British and the Afrikaners. They did not feel obliged to observe this boundary line.
They felt that those who had stolen their land had to pay the price.
Large numbers of Basotho crossed the Warden line, occupied  farms and stole cattle from the
Afrikaner farmers. Posholi’s land had been cut from Lesotho by the Warden line. He, therefore, acted
independently to make life difficult for the Afrikaner farmers. He raided the  farms for cattle’
(Thompson, 1975: 152).  For Posholi and other chiefs living along the borders, there was a
connection between cattle raiding and the territorial dispute. For example, Posholi used to say: “They
have taken away my country and those who have done it must feed me” (Sanders, 1975: 204). He
and other chiefs including Jan Letele, a chief of the Mokoteli tribe, were hoping that by harassing the
farmers along the borders they would persuade them to leave. In the opinion of the Afrikaners,  these
activities were  purely stock theft which was committed in time of peace and had nothing to do with
territorial disputes (Sanders, 1975: 204).
The situation  along the borders was getting out of control, particularly in the vicinity of Vechtkop
and Koesburg. Cross-border stock theft, disorder, violence and border infringements  became the
order of the day. Major Warden was constantly challenging Moshoeshoe’s authority and his hostility
towards Moshoeshoe’s people was not constructive under the prevailing situation. According to
Machobane (1990: 30), Warden went all out to try and subject Moshoeshoe to British authority on
the pretext that Basotho had raided cattle belonging to the Afrikaner settlers.
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The British were finding it difficult to control either the Afrikaners or the Basotho.  They declared
war on the Basotho, but suffered humiliating defeats at the hands of the  Basotho in the battles of
Viervoet and Berea which were fought between 1851 and 1852 (Eloff, 1979: 9). The price of
controlling the situation in the area was too high. Therefore, the British decided to withdraw south
of the Orange River in 1954 (Gill, 1993: 97).
When the British left, they had not settled the border dispute between the Basotho and the Afrikaners.
As a result, conflict was inevitable. The situation along the borders continued to deteriorate. The
Basotho living along the borders regarded the Afrikaner farmers as intruders and they made life
difficult for them. The Afrikaner farmers on the other hand were prepared to do anything to protect
their property. For the Afrikaners, it was becoming obvious that order and peace could only be
achieved if their government was prepared to ‘guard the border with force and punish transgressors
in order to deter prospective cattle thieves’ (Eloff, 1979: 11).
3.3   From the First Basotho-Boer War to the annexation of Lesotho by the British 
On the 6th October 1855, Sir George Grey, the British Governor, convened a meeting of
representatives from Lesotho and the Free State. The meeting was held in Smithfield where  Basotho
and  Afrikaner claims overlapped. This meeting was also  aimed at  addressing the issue of stock-
theft. He insisted that Moshoeshoe and his leading chiefs should come to an understanding with
Boshof, the President of the Orange Free State. Boshof had prepared a document which described
among other things, procedures for recovering stolen stock and a prohibition of trespassing by
Basotho on the White farms. The boundary issue was not addressed at all. Moshoeshoe and his men
were forced to sign this document which was called the Smithfield Agreement  (Thompson, 1975:
230-231).
After this meeting, Moshoeshoe tried his level best to keep the peace, but he made it clear to Boshof
that he was not prepared to give up his land and he dismissed the Warden line as unfair and invalid
(ibid: 231). For a few weeks after the Smithfield Agreement was signed by Moshoeshoe and the
Afrikaners in the presence of Grey, the number of thefts along the border greatly diminished. But
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within a short time, cattle theft was resumed on an extensive scale as before. The district between the
line running from Commissie Drift on the southern side of the Koesberg to the Orange River, and the
line drawn by Warden had become the scene of unchecked lawlessness. The Basotho under Letele,
Lebenya, and Posholi were occupying farms and damaging homesteads and orchards  (Theal, 1886:
xxvi-xxvii; Thompson, 1975: 237).
By 1858, “the irreconcilable points of view, together with the continued border violations by Basotho
and the failure of the policy of negotiation made war inevitable”(Eloff, 1979: 11). In March 1858, war
between the Basotho and the Boers finally broke out. The main cause of the war was the situation
which prevailed in the area where the Basotho and the Boer claims overlapped. The Basotho won the
war in the battle field. In this war, the Basotho managed to destroy 124 farm houses, stole 2619 head
of cattle and 4 739 sheep in the districts of Winburg, Bloemfontein and Caledon River (Eloff, 1979:
12). Moshoeshoe wrote several letters to Grey after the war requesting the British to “restore the
country unto its legitimate owners since tracts of Basotho land had been granted to the whites at the
British request” (Thompson, 1975: 246). He said the British should have done this when they
withdrew their protection in the Orange River Valley. Subsequently, the British government rescued
the Orange Free  State from major destruction in the hands of Basotho. 
The peace treaty which was signed after this war was the Treaty of Aliwal North, which drew new
boundaries for Lesotho. The treaty stated that the northern boundary for Lesotho was the one
established by Warden in 1849. The western boundary between the Caledon and the Orange Rivers
ran about midway between the Maitland and Warden lines. Moshoeshoe was disillusioned by this
settlement. He felt that once again he had been let down by a British official whom he trusted to make
a fair settlement of his disputes with his white neighbours (Thompson, 1975: 251). 
The British, also, contributed towards the outcome of the balance of power between the blacks and
the whites in the region. The Afrikaners were given preferential access to guns by the British
government. The second clause of Article 2 of the Bloemfontein Convention of 1854 on the question
of guns stated that “the British-controlled sources of guns and munition of war were preferentially
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closed to those ‘natives of the surrounding states’, in favour of the Boers (Afrikaner) from the Orange
Free State” (Machobane, 1990: 34) (my italics).   Moshoeshoe could see that, given a few years of
building their military might, the Afrikaner Republic would become formidable. He commented that
this clause was making it difficult for the Africans  to protect themselves.  Hence, Moshoeshoe was
anxious to make peace with the Free State.
On the 30th March 1860, a meeting was arranged between the two heads of States, namely,
Moshoeshoe and Marthinus Pretorius to discuss the peace prospects in the area. Pretorius wanted
Moshoeshoe to review a portion of the Basotho army numbering about six thousand cavalry.
Moshoeshoe could not agree to this and thus the conference broke up (Machobane, 1990: 31-33).
Frontier incidents and stock thefts did not stop after the war and the meeting between the two heads
of governments. They continued and led to the Second Basotho-Boer (Afrikaner) War of 1865.  The
Afrikaners were far better equipped than they were in the 1858 war. The Basotho were defeated by
the Afrikaners in this war. They were pinned to Thaba Bosiu which was the capital and mountain
fortress of Moshoeshoe. The President of the Free State demanded the following from Moshoeshoe:
40 000 cattle, 5 000 horses, 60 000 sheep, evacuation of Thaba Bosiu, handing over of guns and the
kingdom’s sovereignty, all within four days. Moshoeshoe was, also, to hand over two of his sons as
hostages until all demands had been met. Moshoeshoe refused to give in to the Afrikaners’ demands.
He instead, opted to become a British subject and put forth his request to the British High
Commissioner, Philip Wodehouse (Machobane, 1990: 37). 
Molapo, a son of Moshoeshoe decided to conclude a separate peace with the Free State government
in March 1866. This became known as the Imperani Convention. In this convention he surrendered
an area on both sides of the Caledon River in the vicinity of Ficksburg, Ladybrand and Leribe to the
Free State. He also agreed that he and his people should become subjects of the Free State.
Moshoeshoe soon realised that unless he concluded peace treaty with the Free State, his kingdom
could be completely destroyed. In April 1866, the Thaba Bosiu Convention was concluded. In this
33
convention, Moshoeshoe accepted most of the provisions of the Imperani Convention (Van Wyk,
1967: 3).
In order to prevent the  total defeat of his people, Moshoeshoe called upon the British government
to annex his territory. As the immediate cause of the 1865 war was the unauthorised raid of the
Afrikaners by Lesaoana, Wodehouse had been reluctant to take Lesotho under the wing of the British
government before Moshoeshoe punished Lesaoana. But as the war dragged on, the British
government realised that besides Moshoeshoe’s request for protection, there was need for formal
control of Basotho. They dreaded the prospect of the defeat of the Afrikaners by the Basotho
(Machobane, 1990: 37).
At the same time, Wodehouse feared that if the Afrikaners could be allowed to conquer Lesotho, it
could result in important changes in the political position of several powers in South Africa and this
could not be allowed. These changes would include the Orange Free State gaining control of the
Indian Ocean port of St John’s. The British feared that the  unending border conflicts between the
Basotho and the Afrikaners would affect immigration from Europe and the Overberg trade
(Machobane,1990: 37). 
Britain declared Lesotho a British Protectorate in 1868 (Van Wyk, 1967: 3). The present boundaries
between Lesotho and South Africa were finally decided in the  Aliwal North Convention, which was
signed in 1869 by the two countries.  The convention required the Free State to give up the territory
which lay east of the Caledon River and which had been acquired under the 1866 Convention (Van
Wyk, 1967:3). All the Basotho who were living west of this boundary had to return to the Lesotho
side while the whites who were living on the Lesotho side were forced to evacuate the area.
The Basotho were embittered by the loss of a big portion of their fertile land. They felt that
Moshoeshoe had been forced to sign the convention because of  circumstances beyond his control.
As a result, the Basotho have always regarded the areas which were surrendered to the Free State
as rightfully theirs and this perception still exists to date. Due to the loss of their land, a certain
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pattern of behaviour has developed along the borders. There is constant violation of the boundary line
by Basotho. As the population grew, the desire to recover their lost territory increased. Only the
presence of the British authority in Lesotho prevented further outbreaks of major border trouble. 
The conflicts between the border communities of the two countries  continued during the British rule
in Lesotho which lasted for almost a century (1868-1966). The British authorities did not address this
issue of the border conflicts properly.  They annexed Lesotho to protect the British commercial
interests, the balance of power in South Africa and to a lesser extend,  for the security of Lesotho.
At a later stage,  it was assumed that in due course, Lesotho will become part of South Africa. So,
when the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910,  the British expected Lesotho to join the Union.
But Lesotho never joined the Union because of the historical animosities between the Basotho and
the Afrikaners. The tragedies of the border wars were still too fresh in the minds of many Basotho
leaders to wish to join the former enemy. Another reason was that the Basotho were still very angry
towards the Afrikaner for the territory which had been taken away from them. 
One way in which the British tried to  prevent the outbreak of a major border conflict between the
Basotho and the Afrikaners was by passing an Act called the Peace Preservation Act in 1878. The
aim of the Act was to disarm all the Africans under the Cape Colony. The Act was to apply in areas
which were completely under the Cape colonial rule. At the time of its passing, Lesotho was then,
not completely under the British rule. Even though Lesotho was a British Protectorate, it retained a
high level of autonomy. According to the agreement reached between Moshoeshoe and the British
authorities, Lesotho was to be ruled according to Basotho Customary Law. As a result, this Act
could not be applied directly to Lesotho. In 1879, an opportunity presented itself to the Cape
government to apply the Act in Lesotho when one of the chiefs under King Letsie I (Moshoeshoe’s
successor),  Moorosi of Quthing, got involved in an armed conflict with the British authorities.
Moorosi was defeated on 20 November 1879. The British decapitated him and sent his head to King
William’s Town. After this war, the British announced that the Act would be applied to the whole
of Lesotho and that Quthing was to be confiscated. The Basotho protested on the grounds that
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according to the Moshoeshoe-Wodehouse agreement, Lesotho was a territory for Basotho only and
confiscating Quthing would be against that agreement (Machobane,1990: 52-53).
On the issue of the Peace Preservation Act, the Basotho argued that the Cape government could not
disarm them because of the small rebellion of a group under Moorosi. They also said if they were
disarmed, they would be reduced to the status of servitude. After receiving an urgent message from
Sir Bartle Frere in Cape Town,  Letsie ordered   his people to disarm with immediate effect. The
majority of the population, inspired by Masopha, Letsie’s brother, and Lerotholi, Letsie’s heir,
challenged the order and refused to hand in their guns (Machobane,1990: 53).
The turn of events in Lesotho made the Cape government  more determined to disarm the Basotho.
When the delegation which had been sent to Cape Town to present the case of Lesotho came back
with the report that disarmament was to proceed, the decision was rejected by the elements inspired
by Masopha. They said disarmament to them was ‘a load too heavy to carry  and they would rather
fight than lose their manhood’ (Machobane,1990: 54).
The war between the Basotho and the colonial officers started in September 1880. Letsie was trying
to impress the British officials on the one hand by pretending to disarm his people.  But on the other
hand,  he was secretly supporting the ‘rebels’ and all the parties involved knew about it. The war
became known as the Gun War. It lasted for seven months and the Basotho came out victorious in
this war (Machobane,1990: 54-55).  
The change in the agricultural production of Lesotho and the role Lesotho came to play as a labour
reserve have, in a sense, also contributed to the present border problems between Lesotho and South
Africa.  Before British colonization, Lesotho used to be a rich and self-sufficient agricultural
economy. It was self-reliant in food and well integrated into the cash economy of South Africa. When
minerals were discovered in South Africa in the late 1860s, Lesotho became the ‘grain basket’ of
South Africa, in spite of having lost a large lowland area . The  Basotho farmers were producing
enough grain to feed themselves and the surplus was exported to the  mining towns of South Africa.
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The Afrikaner farmers in the Free State region were no competition for Basotho farmers. The
Basotho did not seem to have a reason to go and work in the mines. They were competing with
Australian suppliers for supplying the mining towns of South Africa with wheat (Strom, 1978:32-33).
Agricultural produce of Lesotho only started decreasing in absolute terms in the 1930s. In 1932, the
South African Prime Minister, General Herzog wrote to the British Secretary of State, J.H. Thomas,
to ask for restrictions on wheat farming in Lesotho. White farmers in South Africa had been
complaining about the competition from the Basotho farmers. In 1933, the South African government
repeated these complaints and threatened to restrict the recruitment of labour to the British-owned
mines and to incorporate the British territories if they do not do something about it (Strom, 1978: 34-
35). 
The South African government  made sure that the scale was tipped in favour of the Afrikaner
farmers.  They drove Basotho farmers out of business in order to give the Afrikaner farmers a
monopoly of the markets despite the fact that the Basotho had already lost a large portion of their
arable land to South Africa. The South African government subsidised the Afrikaner farmers  thus
making their produce cheaper. The British government collaborated with the South African
government by ensuring that the mines had a regular supply of labour. They introduced what they
called ‘hut tax’ which meant that every male head of the household had to pay a certain amount of
money in a form of tax to the British colonial government. Even Basotho farmers who had been able
to pay their tax with the income derived from their agricultural produce could no longer afford to do
so because of competition from across the border. They were, therefore, forced to go into  the
migrant labour system. Lesotho was reduced to the status of labour supplier for South Africa, and
with the introduction of the migrant labour system in Lesotho, the agricultural activity was mainly
left in the hands of women. 
Today, Lesotho cannot provide its population with enough maize which is their staple food.  The
Lesotho government has to rely mainly on South Africa to feed its population. More than 600 farms
in the conquered territory (see Figure 2),  with a combined area of about 813 000 hectares are very
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good for agriculture.  This ‘conquered territory’ therefore developed into the “granary” of the Free
State (Eloff, 1979: 35-36).
With the recent recession in the price of gold  in the world market, the migrant labour system which
Lesotho has come to depend on, has been adversely affected by these developments. Some gold
mines have been closed because of the decline in the price of gold. A large number of Basotho mine
workers have been retrenched. The implication of this for Lesotho is that poverty is on the increase.
As more and more people are out of work, the chances of cross-border crime will increase. Poverty
and desperation drives people to resorting to  criminal activities.
Due to all these historical developments, stock-theft has continued to be a central component of  the
Lesotho/South Africa border relations.  Some Basotho justify their stealing on the neighbouring
South African farms as a  compensation  for these injustices.  Even today stock theft in the conquered
territory constitute a major threat to peace between Lesotho and South Africa. Border problems have
come to include other criminal activities such as drug-trafficking, car theft, cutting of the fences along
the border and murders.
3.4  Conclusion.
The loss of land by the Basotho to the Afrikaners has led to a certain pattern of behaviour along the
borders. There are constant violations of the boundary line by the Basotho which have resulted in the
stealing of agricultural produce and stock from the South African side. This has created a lot of
tension between Lesotho and South Africa.  Basotho living along the  borders have attacked white
farmers for cattle and vandalised their property.   Successive attempts have failed to bring a lasting
peace. Not even the  wars which were fought  brought a permanent solution to the border conflicts
between the two countries. The British take over in Lesotho in 1868 did not contribute much towards
solving the border problems between the two countries. In fact, what the British did was to ensure
the systematic exploitation of Lesotho by South Africa.
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It is a fact that the  Basotho still feel angry about losing so much of their land to South Africa and this
resentment along the border still continues to date.  Their anger has been confirmed by the police
reports on cross-border stock thefts. In their interviews with the members of the public on the
Lesotho side, the Lesotho and the South African Police discovered that  there was a general feeling
that as far as the Basotho were concerned, they did not regard the taking of stock from the South
African side which used to be part of Lesotho as stealing. They are simply taking what is rightfully
theirs (Jonker & Monane, 1998).  Stock theft across the borders  thrives  as a vicious circle of
revenge and shows no signs of abating. Today, border problems have incorporated other cross-border
crimes such as drug-trafficking, car theft, vandalising of government property (cutting border fences)
and murders.
Cross-border crimes between Lesotho and South Africa are also aggravated by poverty on the
Lesotho side.  The decline in agricultural produce since the 1930s has lead to increasing poverty in
Lesotho. The decline in agricultural produce was initially compensated for by the migrant labour
system.  However, as a result of recent recession in the prices of gold, Basotho who have been
depending on the mines for their living have been adversely affected . A large number of them have
already been retrenched. This means a number of families without any source of income has increased.
As poverty rises, the temptation to get involved in criminal activities increases.   Hence, cross-border
crime has increased in recent years. 
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CHAPTER 4
4. THE INTRODUCTION OF GRASSROOTS DIPLOMACY BETWEEN LESOTHO AND
SOUTH AFRICA
4.1  Introduction
The last chapter  looked at the historical background to Lesotho/South Africa border relations, thus,
providing a background to the discussion of grassroots diplomacy. It showed how the historical
emergence of modern Lesotho left some perpetual border  conflicts which have remained the central
characteristic of relations between the two countries.  These conflicts have manifested themselves in
the form of cattle rustling and stealing of other agricultural produce across the borders. Today, these
problems now include other criminal activities such as drug- trafficking, car theft, cutting of the
fences along the border and murder.  We have seen how the situation prevailing in the conquered
territories led to three wars within a short period of  less than ten years. We have also seen how
successive settlements failed to bring permanent peace between the border communities of the two
countries. The historical dispossession of the Basotho has contributed to the hostile relations which
existed between the two governments, especially in the post-1970 period. 
This chapter is an attempt to assess different policy frameworks which were adopted by the two
governments during different periods. It identifies four different periods in the post-1966 years in the
relations between Lesotho and South Africa. The first period  from 1966 to 1970,  when Lesotho
government pursued a policy of dialogue and co-existence. The second period  from 1972 to 1980,
characterised by confrontation and hostility. The third period, from 1980 to 1985, was characterised
by the introduction of the Inter-Governmental Liaison Committee (IGLC). Finally, the fourth period
from 1985 to date is characterised by the establishment of the District Liaison Committees as
instruments of grassroots diplomacy. 
But before discussing the above-mentioned periods, I wish to highlight a few pointers about the
British attitude towards border problems and the issue of the conquered territory which played an
important role in shaping border relations between Lesotho and South Africa. During British rule in
Lesotho, the British authorities did not follow a particular policy  dealing with border problems
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between Lesotho and South Africa. The reason for this was that it was assumed that, in time, Lesotho
together with Botswana and Swaziland would join the Union of South Africa. As early as 1913, the
South African government had asked Britain to incorporate the above-mentioned countries into the
Union (Eloff, 1979: 37). It was therefore assumed that as soon as Lesotho became part of the Union
of South Africa, the border conflicts would no longer be an issue. Lesotho never joined the Union
and later,  the British government decided to give independence to all its Protectorates.
Even though the British avoided addressing the issue of the conquered territory, it kept on coming
up from time to time. As the population grew, the desire to recover this conquered territory
increased. Prior to Lesotho’s independence, the political parties used the land issue to gain national
support and international sympathy. By 1962, the leaders of the Basotho National Party (BNP) and
the Basotho Congress Party (BCP) had written letters to the United Nations, requesting it to
intervene on behalf of the Basotho on the question of the territory conquered by South Africa.
“Britain and South Africa were accused of robbing the Basotho of living space and of the ability to
maintain themselves by depriving them of the most productive ground to the west of the Caledon
River” (Eloff, 1979: 38).  It became obvious that somehow,  this issue of conquered territory was
going to feature a lot in the post independence relations between Lesotho and South Africa.
4.2  Dialogue and Coexistence with South Africa -1966-70
When the Basotho obtained their  independence from the British in 1966, they inherited the colonial
state machinery as it was. The colonial state was pro-South Africa. The BNP  government which took
over from the British  did not want to upset the order of things with their neighbour. They  were
aware of the economic interdependence which existed between Lesotho and South Africa.  They were
a product of capitalist system of the colonial power.  They, therefore, pursued a policy of dialogue
and coexistence with South Africa. This pro-South African policy was very unpopular amongst the
majority of the Basotho who hated the Afrikaners because of the history of these two groups. The
memory of how they had lost their land was still fresh in the minds of the Basotho.  
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In November 1968, the South African government declared that it was ready to appoint a combined
border commission in co-operation with Lesotho. South Africa pointed out that this proposed
commission would  concentrate on the Lesotho-Cape and Lesotho-Natal borders, because there was
an uncertainty in these areas as to the exact location of the border. The Free State was not to be
included because the Caledon River constituted  most of the border (Eloff, 1979: 39). In other words,
the South African government was not prepared to talk about the Free State which was the very area
which the Basotho regarded as rightfully theirs. The Lesotho government was unable to pursue this
boundary issue until in the post-1970 period. It was too busy with the preparations for the second
elections which were held in 1970.
4.3  Confrontation with South Africa: The Politicisation of the Border Issue -1972 to 1980
i) The Politicisation of the Border Issue
In the post-1970 period, relations between Lesotho and South Africa took a new direction,
characterised by hostility and confrontation. The change in relations between Lesotho and South
Africa was brought about by the change in Lesotho’s policy towards South Africa after the 1970
election. The new policy of the Lesotho government towards the South African government was
characterised by the challenging of the apartheid system and  politicisation  the border issue.
From 1972 onwards, the Prime Minister of Lesotho, Leabua Jonathan, began to challenge the
apartheid regime openly. He undertook to do whatever he could to alleviate the sufferings of black
people in South Africa. The shift in policy towards South Africa was necessary to divert the eyes of
the international community from Lesotho’s internal political problems. Jonathan’s party had hijacked
the government when it became obvious that the BCP was winning the 1970 election and it was being
criticised by the  international community. For the Lesotho government to gain the support of the
international community once again, it had to do something which would receive international
support. Hence, the decision to challenge the apartheid system. South African government was not
impressed by the new attitude of Jonathan. Therefore, there was a break-down in relations between
these two countries.
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In the circumstances of the rising hostility between the two governments, the border question became
politicised by the government of Lesotho. The break-down of relations was not just at state-to-state
level. It also affected the grassroots. The hostile relations between the two governments fuelled the
border problems. Stock theft along the borders had not disappeared during British rule but it
deteriorated in these hostile environment. For example, when Jonathan addressed the pitsos (public
gatherings), he used to talk about the territory which have been conquered by the Boers (Afrikaners)
and his determination to make sure that the conquered territory was returned to its rightful owners.
This talk rekindled the anger the Basotho  felt over the loss of their land. Some cattle rustlers became
even more determined to steal stock across the border as a way of redressing the wrongs of the past.
The South African government accused the Lesotho government of becoming communist. This was
used as an excuse by the South African officials to harass Lesotho citizens travelling in and out of
South Africa at the borders. There were reported incidents of violence and the killing of Basotho by
the South African Police along the borders. Complaints by the Lesotho government were ignored by
the South African government.
 
The question of the Conquered territory between Lesotho and South Africa came up again in May
1973. The Prime Minister of Lesotho, Leabua Jonathan, demanded that the South African
government return the conquered territory to its rightful owners namely the Basotho. The Lesotho
government had already approached the United Nations for legal advice and to ensure an impartial
decision on the question of the conquered territory. The Lesotho government raised this issue again
in 1974. The South African president accused Jonathan of causing strained relations between Lesotho
and South Africa  (Eloff, 1979: 40).  
In 1976 the Foreign Minister of Lesotho,  visited Europe. The issue of the conquered territory once
again came up during his European tour. While in Bonn, the Foreign Minister spoke of “Lesotho’s
battle against racism and colonialism and attempts by the Pretoria regime to incorporate Lesotho into
the Republic of South Africa” (Eloff, 1979: 41). In May 1976, the South African Foreign Minister
visited Lesotho. The border  issue was  top of the agenda. The meeting took place behind  closed
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doors and the outcome was not made available to the public. The border issue was not just politicised
to win local sympathy, but also to gain international support. 
  
In 1976, South Africa announced the so called “independence” of   Transkei.  Transkei offered
Lesotho an alternative route to the sea if Lesotho could give her recognition, but the Lesotho
government made it clear that they would not recognise Transkei or any other Bantustan. On the 26th
October 1976, the very day on which the Transkei obtained its  “independence” , its Premier, Kaizer
Matanzima, announced the closure of the entire South Eastern border between Transkei and Lesotho.
The border posts which were affected by this closure were Qacha’s Nek, Ramatsiliso’s gate and Tele
border posts. About 238,114 Basotho were affected by this closure (Sixishe, 1984: 94). The Lesotho
government complained to the South African government whose reply was that they had no control
over the closed border posts since Transkei was now “independent”.
 
The attempt by the Lesotho government to solve the problem bilaterally with South Africa did not
succeed  and thus, they were left with no other choice but to complain to the UN General Assembly.
The international community condemned the actions of South Africa because Transkei was not
recognised as an independent country and it was obvious that South Africa  was using Transkei as
a pawn of its destabilisation policy  towards Lesotho. The international community rallied behind
Lesotho with aid to lessen the economic effects of the border closure on the Basotho.
Like the South African authorities, the Transkei authorities started harassing Lesotho citizens.  This
was interpreted by the Lesotho government as an attempt to force a confrontation between the two
countries. The citizens of Transkei crossed the border illegally and impounded the livestock of the
Basotho. When the Basotho attempted to cross the border and recover their stolen stock, they were
given heavy fines by the Transkei authorities. These incidents were reported to the South African
government which never bothered to respond. Instead, the Matanzima regime made threats against
the Lesotho government. For example, Matanzima’s ‘Foreign Minister’, Digby Koyana, wrote to
Lesotho’s Foreign Minister, Charles Dube Molapo, on the 15th April 1977 saying: “The government
of Transkei would not like to find itself in a position where it is compelled to adopt retaliatory
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measures against your government and/or people” (Cit in  Sixishe, 1984: 98). The behaviour of the
Transkei citizens clearly shows how the people at grassroots reacted to hostility at state-to-state level.
The Transkei citizens translated the hostility of their  government towards the Lesotho government
into their day-to-day interactions with the Lesotho citizens. 
After the  border closure by Transkei, Lesotho’s Foreign Minister called upon the South African
government to appoint a border commission with immediate effect to solve the question of the
disputed territory which had been a thorny issue in  relations between these two countries, once and
for all. He further pointed out that  ‘the legality and morality of the second Treaty of Aliwal North
(1869) could be challenged on the grounds that it was signed between the Afrikaners and  the  British
and the Basotho  were  not  part  of  the  negotiation  process’ (Eloff, 1979: 41).
The border problems in the Transkei/Lesotho area  escalated during this time of hostility between the
two governments.  It is most unfortunate that even to date, these border problems between Lesotho
and Transkei still continues and  has rendered that area the most troubled border area between the
two countries. The situation in that area is so bad that there is a fear among the community leaders
and the police that “a full-scale war” could break out on this border if both governments do not step
up security measures in the area. In the year 1998 alone, it is claimed that more than 70 South African
and Basotho nationals have died (Motale, 1998: 3).
ii) The African National Congress Presence in Lesotho and the South African Policy of
Destabilisation Towards Lesotho
The South African government, also, used the presence of  ANC refugees in Lesotho as another
excuse to harass the Basotho.  They felt threatened by the good relationship which existed between
the ANC and the Lesotho government. They raised this issue at every meeting they had with  Lesotho
government officials. They accused the Lesotho government of allowing the ANC  to  use  Lesotho
as  “a  springboard  to  launch  attacks on South Africa” (Sejanamane, 1988: 15). 
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The South African government retaliated by establishing  the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), which
was the armed wing of the Basotho Congress Party (BCP) and allowed it to launch attacks on
Lesotho from the South African soil (Sixishe, 1984: 105). They used the LLA to destabilise Lesotho.
The people who were seriously affected by these attacks were mostly the ones living along the
borders.  They were more likely to become victims in the cross-fire between the Lesotho Security
Forces and the LLA guerilla fighters. Indeed, quite a number of shepherds from these border villages
were mistaken for LLA fighters and were killed by the Lesotho Security Forces.  Some of the families
living along the borders were accused of harbouring  LLA fighters. Many innocent people became
victims.
During this time of hostility and confrontation between the two countries,  border relations
deteriorated. The border problems which had always been there were exacerbated by the hostility.
The element of courtesy and diplomacy was no longer visible in the way the two governments were
conducting their affairs. Unfortunately the  people who suffered the most were the border
communities. They lived in fear of becoming  victims of the cross-fire between the two countries.
The whole situation was getting out of hand. The Lesotho government used LLA activities and the
fact that they were supported by the South African government  to embarrass the later internationally.
The Lesotho government made it a point that they raised this issue at every General Assembly. This
finally led to a movement towards grassroots diplomacy. Negotiations between the two governments
were called for  to try and come up with solutions to these problems.
4.4  The Peka Bridge Meeting: The Beginning of Grassroots Diplomacy 
When P.W Botha took over from B.J. Vorster as the President of South Africa, the relations between
the two countries were at their lowest ebb and  the leaders of both countries were called upon to meet
and try to defuse the situation. The activities of LLA along the borders had rendered the area very
unsafe. The farmers and the businessmen in the border towns of South Africa put pressure on their
government to do something about the situation along the borders because it had a negative impact
on their businesses. They therefore called upon their President to meet with the Prime Minister of
Lesotho to resolve these problems.
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Neither of the two leaders, namely Jonathan and Botha, was prepared to cross the border into each
other’s country. It was finally agreed that the meeting be held in a caravan at Peka Bridge on the
Lesotho/South African border, which was an acceptable compromise for both parties. The meeting
took place on the 20th August 1980. It was  attended only  by  Jonathan and Botha with their Foreign
Ministers. A very important decision was reached at this meeting. This was the decision to set up a
Lesotho/South Africa Liaison Committee which was to look at ways to defuse tension between the
two countries and recommend areas of co-operation on matters that were of grave concern to
Lesotho (Sixishe, 1984: 111-112). The Lesotho/South Africa Liaison Committee  became known as
the Inter-Governmental Liaison Committee (IGLC) and it was instrumental in the establishment of
the DLCs. The Peka Bridge meeting, therefore, marks an important point in  relations between the
two countries namely,  the move towards grassroots diplomacy.
After the Peka Bridge meeting, there was a notable decline in the activities of the LLA, but they
resumed shortly after that, which could only mean that something did not go well for the South
African government. This shows the extent of the failure of high level diplomacy in solving the
problem between these two countries. 
4.5  The Inter-Governmental Liaison Committee (IGLC): 1980 to date
The IGLC was established in 1980. The heads of government of both countries, Botha and Jonathan
felt then that regular consultations at senior official level could go a long way towards promoting
healthy neighbourly relations. The IGLC was established as a forum for these consultations. Both
countries had much to gain from negotiating on a wide variety of issues which complicated their
relationship and threatened  to sow the seeds of disagreement and instability (Weisfelder, 1997: 32).
Operating under the general committee of the IGLC were various sub-committees. These sub-
committees included the Agricultural Sub-committee, the Consular/Migration Sub-committee, the
Drakensberg/Maluti Conservation Programme Sub-committee, the Educational Sub-committee, the
Health Sub-committee, the Sub-committee for Justice, the Labour Sub-committee, the Transport
Sub-committee, the Tourism Sub-committee, the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, and the Sub-
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committee on Security Matters (RLMP/SAP). All these sub-committees had a mandate to promote
closer cooperation between the two countries in their different fields (Lesotho government: 5th
November, 1992).
In all the IGLC meetings, the Lesotho Delegation was  led by the Principal Secretary of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. The South African Delegation was led by the Director-General of Foreign Affairs.
The meetings of the IGLC were held annually towards the end of the year. The purpose of these
meetings was to review the progress reports of these various sub-committees. These sub-committees
were therefore expected to meet at least twice before the big meeting of the IGLC and this was
supposed to happen on  an annual basis.
The establishment of the IGLC offered the two countries a platform for the discussion of many issues
and problems arising from the day-to-day interactions of the Basotho and the South Africans. It also
enhanced the possibilities for mutual beneficial cooperation between the two countries as neighbours.
The agendas of the meetings of the IGLC reflected the many concerns of the two countries. In the
case of Lesotho during the apartheid era,  the promotion of the notion that the two governments
should reciprocally accord dignified treatment to each other’s citizens was of paramount importance.
The Lesotho government felt strongly that dignified treatment of each other’s citizens was of
paramount importance and was the very basis for neighbourly relations (Lesotho Government: 13th
August, 1993).
The senior government officials of both countries, through their efforts in the IGLC, have done their
level best to keep the relations between the two countries afloat. Through the different sub-
committees, the IGLC has ensured that there was cooperation between the two countries in different
fields. Each committee was expected to give a progress report in the IGLC meeting at the end of
every year and this  kept the committee members on their toes. The importance of the role played by
the  IGLC  in ensuring the maintenance of  good relations between Lesotho and South Africa was
eloquently stated by one leader of the South African delegation, Geldenhuys,  in his  opening remarks
to the Eleventh meeting of the IGLC, when he said:
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“Politics, the very essence of relations are the most unstable ingredient of cooperation.
Politicians can come and go ...but officials have a tendency to stay and  are usually
responsible for the permanence that keeps the relations afloat  when the  going gets tough.
Above all, the official is the practical creature who, in spite of  the ups and downs of
politics, can be relied on to continue with the essential  business of daily bilateral activities
which cannot only be implemented when relations   take a temporary depth (sic). That is
why I can say that we have set an example with our Inter-Governmental Liaison Committee,
an example that can rightly be noticed and   followed by many in the international
community, but  especially by countries in Africa who need each other in practice but lack
the practical  realism to use their officials to break the bonds of suspicion and sow the seeds
of trust that can grow into   fields of cooperation and goodwill”.  (Lesotho Government:
20th September, 1990).
4.6   The District Liaison Committees (DLCs)
I wish to emphasize the important point that from the onset, the DLCs were never dragged into party
politics. They have remained independent from the influence of politicians in both countries. This
point was confirmed by various members of the DLCs I interviewed. The fact that they continued
operating even when the relations were at their lowest ebb shows that politician had no influence over
them. The idea of establishing the DLCs was born in the IGLC meetings. The members of the IGLC,
who are mainly senior government officials from the two countries, felt that the IGLC was doing a
good job, but still it was not enough to harmonise  relations between the two countries. They felt that
there was a need for their efforts within the IGLC to be complemented by direct grassroots contact
and cooperation at the level of respective communities across the border. This led to the birth of the
DLCs which were established in 1985 by the IGLC (Lesotho Government: 20th September, 1990).
So, these DLCs were the latest addition to the sub-committees under the IGLC.
  
The DLCs were established in all the border districts of Lesotho, except   Qacha’s Nek. The problem
was that Qacha’s Nek shared a border with Transkei and the Lesotho government did not recognise
the Bantustans as independent states. Therefore, they could not have any bilateral relations with any
one of them. The Qacha’s Nek/Matatiele DLC was only established in the post-apartheid era when
the Bantustans became re-incorporated into South Africa.
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4.7  Functions of the District Liaison Committees
The main function of the DLCs is to promote the interests of the communities residing on either side
of the border and to foster a spirit of good neighbourliness with regard to government policies. It is
therefore the duty of the DLCs to try and overcome the problems which  threaten  peace between
these border communities. The main problems which are faced by the border communities are cross-
border crimes. These include among other things, illegal crossings of the border. Sometimes this
illegal act is committed in order to carry out innocent business such as shopping or going to the
doctors on the other side of the border. In some instances, illegal crossings of the border have
resulted in the theft of livestock and agricultural products, illegal trade and smuggling of goods ,
trafficking in drugs, firearms and stolen vehicles, cutting of border fences, illegal grazing of animal,
and sometimes  unfortunate deaths along the border lines (Khomongoe,1999). These problems are
common to all the border regions namely, Lesotho/Free State, Lesotho/Transkei and
Lesotho/KwaZulu-Natal. The only difference is the varying degree of the problem. For example, the
Lesotho/Transkei area has the most serious problem of violent stock theft of all the areas and this will
be discussed in the next chapter.
The DLCs have identified poverty as one of the causes of cross-border crime. In order to get to the
bottom of the problem, the DLC members therefore feel that it is necessary to fight the root of the
problem which is poverty. Initiation of development projects is therefore an attempt on the part of
the DLCs to help the border communities help themselves and reduce the temptation to become
involved in criminal activities. The DLCs also facilitate cross-border farmer relationships under the
Agricultural sub-committee. According to the rules of procedure for the DLCs, as drafted by the two
governments, the DLCs have to work towards the promotion of the following:
!  They have to give assistance with the supply of agricultural production inputs and equipment
on an agreed basis in agreement with government recommendations and regulations. 
!  They should provide guidance, advice and possible assistance with regard to agricultural
practices such as the use of farm equipment.
!  They should monitor the movement and health of livestock.
!  They should foster informal agricultural training and extension.
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! They should discuss agricultural problems with a view to formulating mutually acceptable
solutions.
!  They also discuss any other matter which may be raised such as commerce, transport,    labour,
marketing, processing, etc.
!  They also work towards the advancement of bilateral nature conservation issues and    related
matters.
!  They are to encourage cross-border development projects.
!  DLC members have a mandate to discuss any matter of a bilateral nature between Lesotho and
South Africa. 
4.8  Membership of the District Liaison Committees
The DLCs consist mainly of the farming communities from both sides of the borders. They also
consist of local tribal authorities, namely chiefs and herdsmen along the borders. The armed forces
are also represented in these committees. Since the DLCs are supposed to facilitate cross-border
farmers’ relationships, each delegation has a government farming specialist  who advises the local
farmers and keep them up-to-date with the latest farming technologies.  The observers from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and South African High Commission act as liaison officers between the
committees and the central governments, because the latter have to be informed about the activities
of the former so that they can intervene where their assistance is required (Mjikeliso, 1999). 
Despite the fact that some members of the DLCs are government officials, the DLCs have been given
a high level of autonomy to deal with matters affecting the border communities without the
interference of the central government. The DLCs may invite specialists to attend meetings as and
when required. The portfolios of each delegation from both countries are as follows:
Lesotho Delegation
District Agricultural Officer
District Co-operative Officer
District Secretary
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Farmer Representative (Crop/ livestock)
District Veterinarian, as and when necessary
Deputy District Officer
Observer from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Principal Chief of the area
Local Chief along the border
Lesotho Defence Force (LDF)
Royal Lesotho Mounted Police
National Secret Service
RSA Delegation
Town Clerk
District Agricultural Unions
Agricultural co-operatives
Nature Conservation (Conservator)
Town Council
Regional Director of Veterinary services, as and when necessary
Local Tribal Authority (Chiefs along the border).
Agricultural Officer
South African Police Service (SAPS)
South African National Defence Force (SANDF)
South African High Commission (SAHC).
4.9  Funding of the District Liaison Committees
According to the rules of procedure for the DLCs, each delegation is supposed to bear its own
expenses. This means that each government is supposed to sponsor its own delegation, but if special
needs arise, they may be referred to the South African High Commission in Maseru. The South
African DLC delegations are funded by a special fund which falls under the Department of Foreign
Affairs Development Fund. This fund enables the South African members to organise meetings and
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run the activities of the DLCs efficiently since most of them are not civil servants but individuals who
are doing the work voluntarily. The Lesotho DLC delegations are funded by the Ministry of
Agriculture. Most of the development projects initiated by the DLCs have been funded by the South
African High Commission.
4.10   How the District Liaison Committees work
In order to achieve their objectives, the DLCs work through meetings. In these meetings, members
identify problems which are creating tensions between the border communities and come up with
suggestions for a plan of action to be followed. They meet as and when  necessary, but the minimum
number of times the DLCs should  sit is twice a year. The venues for the meeting alternate between
the two countries. 
Whenever necessary, the DLC members hold pitsos (public gatherings) among the border
communities on the Lesotho side to obtain their views on certain issues and educate them about
certain things. The farmers living along the borders on both sides are the eyes and ears of the
committees. They report any illegal activities to the committees who in turn request the assistance
of the armed forces. The fact that the armed forces are represented on these committees makes things
a lot easier. The Maseru/Ladybrand DLC has even requested walkie talkies for their committee
members living along the border to make communication easier in their fight against crime and their
request has been granted. When members of the DLCs are unable to solve a problem at grassroots
level, they refer it to a specialised committee of the IGLC. For example, if a matter needs legal
attention, they will refer it the Sub-committee of Justice.
Once the DLCs have  identified problems and made decisions on their plan of action, it is very
important that the minutes of the meetings be sent to the South African High Commission in Maseru
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lesotho. The observers from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and the South African High Commission are not able to attend each and every meeting. The decisions
made at the DLC forums are  crucial to the politicians.  The Foreign Ministry and the High
Commission have a duty to  follow up on issues which need to be addressed at  higher levels. An
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example of such an issue was a decision  reached  by  the Mafeteng/Wepener DLC that there was an
urgent need to open a border post between Hob house and Ha-Rantsie (Khomongoe,1999). Time was
of the essence because the offices concerned in both countries had to be informed in good time so that
they could take the matter up in the IGLC. After deliberating on the issue, the IGLC has to take it
up with the parliaments in both countries for final endorsement (Mjikeliso,1999). The DLCs have a
duty to ensure that the voices of people living along the  border are heard by the central governments
in these matters which affect them directly. So, through the DLCs, the decisions which are made by
both governments at the highest level are actually reached at the grassroots level.  This is clearly a
good example of “grassroots diplomacy at its best” (Coetzee, 1994: 18).
4.11 Conventional Diplomacy Versus Grassroots Diplomacy: Deteriorating Relations Between
Lesotho and South Africa.
After the formation of the IGLC and  the DLCs, conflict between the two governments continued.
The lack of initial success was largely due to prevailing political hostilities.  The two governments
disagreed on the issue of South African refugees based in Lesotho. The South African government
wanted the Lesotho government to dispose of all the ANC refugees in Lesotho and the Lesotho
government was not prepared to do that.  Therefore, the  South African government continued using
LLA to destabilise Lesotho. But when the Lesotho government was not  intimidated, the South
African government was forced to act on its own to pursue its policy of destabilisation (Ajulu, 1995:
13). For example, on the 9th December, 1982,  the South African Defence Force violated the
international borders, raided Maseru and killed 42 people, 30 of whom were  ANC members and 12
others being  local Basotho. The international communities continued to rally behind the Lesotho
government and condemned in the strongest terms, the attack by the South African government.
Meanwhile, South Africa which at the time was faced with intensifying internal resistance and a lot
of pressure from the international community continued with its destabilisation strategy against
Lesotho. On the 20th December 1985, another attack similar to the  December 1982 attack was
launched by the South African Defence Force in which nine people were killed. Six of them were
South African refugees, while three of them were Lesotho citizens. A complaint was filed by the
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Lesotho government with the UN Security Council. The Security Council condemned the killings of
the nine people and the violation of Lesotho’s territorial integrity (Sejanamane, 1988: 16).
The Security Council’s  position  annoyed the South African government which decided  to impose
a total blockade on Lesotho. This was the most devastating strategy used  by South Africa,
considering the geographical position of Lesotho. This and  other factors set the stage for the military
coup of January 20th,1986.
However, the IGLC and the DLCs continued operating despite the fact that relations between the
BNP government and the apartheid government were at  breaking point. They remained the only
positive aspect in the relations between  the two countries at that time. The implication of this is that
even though state-to-state diplomatic relations between Lesotho and South Africa were failing, the
practice of grassroots diplomacy continued between the two countries. The example of Lesotho and
South Africa indicate the importance of drawing  a boundary between the problems of politicians at
the top and what is good for the people at grassroots levels. 
4.12 The District Liaison Committees During the Military Regime
The military regime had a completely different relationship with  apartheid South Africa  from the one
the BNP regime had. They were more submissive to the demands of the South African government.
The issue of the conquered territory was never mentioned by the military government, not even once.
They were willing to compromise quite a lot in the name of  so- called ‘good neighbourliness’. In his
speech on the 24th January,1986, a few days after the coup, Major-General Lekhanya stated that:
“It is our commitment to normalise relations with South Africa and we shall do all that is
humanly possible  to achieve this objective. We espouse the noble principles of peaceful
coexistence and good neighbourliness and we are prepared to demonstrate our sincerity
whenever called upon to do so” (Cit in Sejanamane, 1988: 21).
One of the first signs that the military government was willing to appease the South African
government at all costs was that shortly after their take-over, most of the ANC refugees were
transferred to Zambia, which was something the South African government had wanted for years,
namely, elimination of the of ANC presence in Lesotho.  It did not take long for the military
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government to sign the agreement on the Highlands Water Project with South Africa. For the first
time in the history of the two countries, they exchanged Trade Missions, which were later upgraded
to the level of Embassies.
 
The DLCs as has been indicated,  were  established in 1985, a few months before the military coup.
When the military took over, the DLCs were still at the stage of implementation, but taking into
consideration the kind of  relations the BNP regime and the military  regimes had with the South
African government, one would assume that the DLCs were more likely to benefit from the cosy
relationship between the military regime and the South African government financially, than they
would have during the BNP regime. Since the military government showed its commitment to
peaceful coexistence with South Africa, the South African government was more willing to open its
purse. There is the possibility that the DLCs got more funding for their development projects than
they would have  during the Jonathan regime.
The period of the military rule was actually the very critical stage of the DLCs because it was the
stage of implementation. This was the stage which  determined  whether the DLCs would work as
instruments of grassroots diplomacy or not. The DLCs were faced with all kinds of problems which
will be further discussed in the case study of the Maseru/Ladybrand DLC in the next chapter. It had
not yet been determined who would be responsible for the financial needs of the DLCs on the Lesotho
side. The members of the DLCs were faced with the difficult task of convincing the border
communities in both countries of the importance of solving their problems through these forums. This
was like a trial stage for the DLCs. During this period of  military rule, the DLCs members managed
to get their act together and the wheels for the practice of grassroots diplomacy were set in motion.
By the end of the military rule in 1993, it had become clear that the DLCs were going to succeed. All
the parties involved showed some commitment to ensuring the  success of the DLCs.
The Ministry of Agriculture of Lesotho have now been given the financial responsibility of the DLCs.
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4.13 Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that  relations between Lesotho and South Africa have gone through
different phases in  different periods. Different policy frameworks were followed by these
governments in their relations with each other.  They ranged from dialogue and co-existence to
hostility and confrontation. The issue of conquered territory played a significant role in the
deterioration of relations between these two countries. The politicians in Lesotho politicised it to gain
national and international support.  The two governments tried high level diplomacy to solve their
problems but it never brought long-term solutions. The hostilities between the two governments only
fuelled  the border problems which existed between the two countries. The  border communities
became victims of the hostile exchanges between the two governments.
Relations between the two countries were on the brink of breaking before the leaders of both
countries  resorted to grassroots diplomacy. The pressure applied by the farmers and the businessmen
in the border towns of South Africa  convinced the South African President to meet with the Prime
Minister of Lesotho to deal with border problems which were of particular concern to them, and
moved towards grassroots diplomacy. It was only after resorting to grassroots diplomacy that things
really began to change for these two countries. For the first time in the history of  relations between
the two countries, grassroots diplomacy empowered border communities with regard to matters
affecting them directly. The governments of Lesotho and South Africa have come to appreciate the
importance of involving grassroots people in the issues which affect them. What one can appreciate
in the above discussions is the point that grassroots  diplomacy continued even when conventional
diplomacy was failing. Indeed, the practice of grassroots diplomacy have stood the test of time.
Grassroots diplomacy was  introduced at  two stages. The first stage was the introduction of the
IGLC which consisted of government officials, while the second stage was the introduction of the
DLCs which consisted of member of the border communities. The DLCs are meant to compliment
the efforts of the IGLC. In the history of the two countries, their working relationship has never been
better than since the introduction of grassroots diplomacy. Even when the relationship between the
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politicians at the top were not good, the IGLC and the DLCs provided the tools which ensure  the
continuation of cooperation between the two countries.
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CHAPTER 5
5. THE DISTRICT LIAISON COMMITTEES IN THE POST-APARTHEID YEARS AND
THEIR PERFORMANCE
5.1  Introduction
The last chapter was an attempt to assess  different policy frameworks which were pursued by the
governments of Lesotho and South Africa during different periods. Four different periods in the post-
1966 period in which different policies were pursued, were identified. Grassroots diplomacy, once
it had been established, had survived under the most difficult circumstances in the relations between
the two governments.
This chapter is an attempt to evaluate the performance of the  the DLCs. The Maseru/ Ladybrand and
Qacha’s Nek/Matatiele DLCs are used as case studies to illustrate the successes and challenges facing
the DLCs.  Before looking at the performance of the DLCs, this  chapter will first assess how the
changes in   post-apartheid South Africa  are likely to affect its relations with Lesotho, especially the
grassroots diplomacy between the two countries. 
5.2  South Africa in the Post-Apartheid Era 
By the end of the 1980s, the whole of the Southern African region was experiencing dramatic changes
in its international environment. These changes have been attributed to the end of the Cold War
(Venter, 1997: 73). The changes brought about by the end of the Cold War presented new
opportunities to the people of the region and democratisation was one of them. Lesotho and South
Africa were swept by these winds of change. It became apparent to the non-democratic governments
of both countries that they could no longer  hold on to power.  
On the 2nd February 1990, President de Klerk announced that he was unbanning the African National
Congress (ANC) and  other political organisations as a first major step towards the dismantling of
apartheid. A few weeks later, Lekhanya started the democratisation  process in Lesotho. According
to Southall (1995: 27), this was viewed in Lesotho as evidence that the military could no longer hold
on to power. Three years later in 1993, for the first time in 27 years, Lesotho held  democratic
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elections which were won by the Basotho Congress Party (BCP). The following year, in 1994, South
Africa also held its first multi-party democratic election. The end of apartheid and the democratisation
of South Africa brought hope to the whole Southern African region. Unlike the previous apartheid
government, the democratic government of South Africa was expected to work with the other
countries of the region and not destabilise them.
The demise of apartheid in the South African election of 1994 brought some  great expectations by
the other Southern African countries and the world at large, from  South Africa as a regional power.
South Africa’s relations with the rest of the region in the post-apartheid era have constituted the
major foci of recent academic concerns.
South Africa was aware of the fact that her chances of survival in the post-apartheid period depended
on her co-operation with her neighbours and the rest of the continent. Unlike the old apartheid regime
which had destabilised the region, the new regime understood the interdependence that existed
between it and the neighbouring countries. It realised that its growth and development were linked
with that of the region (Hull, 1996: 33). South Africa could not be allowed to be an island of
development in an ocean of poverty and underdevelopment. This would create a lot of problems
including those of illegal immigrants, who are driven out of their own countries by poverty and
unemployment.
The Southern African region had certain expectations from the new government of South Africa. The
new South African government was  expected to play a big role in the affairs of the region. It was
also expected to be more friendly than the apartheid government. The ANC- led government was
expected to return favours granted to the ANC during the struggle, by these countries which assisted
them in times of need (Maasdorp, 1994: 5; Ajulu, 1995: 52).
Notwithstanding these expectations on the South African government, some  scholars realised that
there were bound to be internal conflicts which might make it difficult for the South African
government   to participate in the affairs of the region as much as it would like to have done. The new
66
government was faced with too many problems which were caused by the imbalances of the previous
government. These problems created a major challenge to the new government.  Therefore, the new
government was more likely to put the country and the people first (Maasdorp, 1995: 5). What that
meant for Lesotho was that South Africa was more likely to neglect her than aid her. However,
because of the geographical position of the two countries, if Lesotho was  allowed to deteriorate
economically, socially and politically, it would present substantial risks to South Africa. Anything
negative happening in Lesotho was likely to spill over into South Africa and vice versa.  
The first test which proved that South Africa could not allow Lesotho to deteriorate came in August
1994, shortly after the Government of   National Unity came into power. King Letsie III of Lesotho
dissolved the democratically elected BCP government. President Mandela of South Africa, together
with his colleagues in Botswana and Zimbabwe, President Masire and President Mugabe mediated
in this conflict and ensured that the democratically elected government was restored. They declared
that coups could no longer be tolerated in the Southern African region. Another test came after the
1998 election of Lesotho when the opposition parties refused to accept the election result and claimed
that they were rigged. The opposition parties were making the country ungovernable, and the
situation was deteriorating very fast daily. Responding to the Prime Minister of Lesotho’s request,
the South African and Botswana government send troops to Lesotho under the umbrella of SADC,
to intervene in Lesotho. Some of the Peace Keeping forces are still stationed in Lesotho until the next
election which is to held in 2000.                    
5.3  South Africa and Lesotho in the Post-Apartheid Period
Immediately after the 1993 election in Lesotho, the South African government assured the BCP
government of Lesotho of its good neighbourliness. In his interview with Coetzee, Ambassador
Visser described relations between Lesotho and South Africa as “grassroots diplomacy at its best”
(Coetzee, 1994: 18). By this he meant that it is state- to-state communication at the highest level, but
also person-to-person communication at the lowest level. After the 1994 election,  the new
government of National Unity continued this policy of good neighbourliness towards Lesotho. 
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Like the rest of the world, the border communities in Lesotho had their own  expectations from  the
democratic South African government. They expected that there would be more cooperation between
the governments of Lesotho and South Africa, especially because they represented the new age of
democracy for the two countries. They both represented the interests of the majority of the people.
They expected this cooperation to be particularly visible at the borders (Tlebere, 1999).  
Because of the contributions of Basotho towards the struggle of the ANC, the government of
National Unity which was led by the ANC was expected to have a soft sport towards Basotho.  In
this circumstances, the border communities assumed that relations along the borders would go from
strength to strength. They still felt that South Africa owed them compensation for their conquered
territory.  With  the coming to power of the  government of National Unity  in 1994, they thought
that the possibility of compensation was more likely to be considered by the new government than
by the previous apartheid government.
5.4  The District Liaison Committees in the Post-Apartheid Era
The DLCs continued with their work in the post-apartheid period. The new regimes in both countries
appreciated the importance of the work these forums were doing, namely, the promotion of
grassroots diplomacy between the two countries, and therefore, they embraced this concept of the
DLCs. Their functions did not change. They continued to harmonise the relations between the border
communities.  Even the 1998 SADC (Southern African Development Community) intervention in
Lesotho did not have any impact upon the functioning of DLCs.  The functioning of the DLCs was
not affected by the spirit of resentment against South Africans which prevailed amongst the Basotho
after what they saw as an ‘act of aggression’ by the South African government.  This resentment was
evidenced by the looting and burning down of the businesses owned by  South African companies in
Maseru and in other major towns of Lesotho.  Shops such as Sales House, Scotts, Pep, and Smart
Center to name but a few, became targets during the touching and looting in these towns.  Cars with
South African registration numbers were being attacked by the rioters immediately after the
intervention. The activities of the DLCs  are very much appreciated by the border communities,
especially the farming community. They were, therefore,  not prepared to do anything to jeopardise
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the benefits they were getting from the DLCs. The only set-back caused by this intervention was that
farmers in Lesotho did not receive assistance with their harvesting from the South African Farmers’
Union in time because of the instability in the country. 
5.5  The Performance of the District Liaison Committees
According to the report of a Foreign Affairs observer (Lesotho Government, 1993), the DLCs have
generally performed well, except for the Qacha’s Nek/Matatiele DLC which is still struggling to
establish itself. The members have undertaken many varied and positive steps to promote better
understanding and co-operation between their respective communities. In many instances common
problems have been resolved at grassroots level and insights have been gained into the concerns and
problems which are being experienced by their neighbours. The DLCs have taken care of most of the
Consular problems without them being brought to the Foreign Ministries of both countries. Such
consular problems include a national of one country dying in another and locating the relatives of the
deceased in the other country. They also include incidents such as the false arrest of the citizens of
one country in another country. Such cases which do not require complicated procedures have been
discussed and resolved at the level of the DLCs.  One of the most positive aspects is that the
committees have expanded their activities and now operate on the basis of mutual trust and
friendship.
One area where the DLCs have been successful is in encouraging co-operation between the police
forces on both sides of the border. Through the efforts of the DLCs, the South African Police and
the Lesotho Police have established cross-border liaison Security Force committees which work hand-
in-hand with the DLCs as indicated by appendix 5.1.  The members of these cross-border liaison
committees for the security forces are also members of the DLCs. Therefore, security matters which
are raised in the DLCs are followed up in these Police/Security Forces forums. These cross-border
liaison committees of the Police force work together across the border to combat cross-border crime
such as drug-trafficking and car theft. They have carried out studies about cross-border crime in their
specific areas and have written joint reports.
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Case Studies
The DLCs in general are doing well. They have gone a long way to improve hostile relations which
existed at the border in the past. In order to evaluate the performance of the DLCs, two case studies
with different backgrounds and experiences will be assessed.   These are the Maseru/Ladybrand and
the Qacha’s Nek/Matatiele DLCs. The Maseru/Ladybrand DLC consist of semi-urban population and
it is based in the low lands. It is now doing very well. On the other hand, the Qacha’s Nek/Matatiele
DLC consist of rural population and is based in the highlands.  It is faced with different problems
which include high crime rate and conspiracy. The  terrain of this area   is also a problem. It is
mountainous and, thus, make the movements of the security forces in their fight against crime very
difficult.   The Qacha’s Nek/Matatiele DLC is therefore, faced  with the most difficult job of
normalising the relations between communities which seem to be deteriorating very fast due to stock
theft. 
i) The Maseru/Ladybrand DLC
The Maseru/Ladybrand DLC consist of the semi-urban population and was established in 1985. At
the time of its establishment, the main problem was the illegal crossing of the border which resulted
in the stealing of stock and other agricultural produce, car theft and trafficking in illicit goods. The
porousness of the border was making it easy for the cross-border criminal activities to take place.
There was a lot of tension and mistrust between the border communities.
Besides the traditional hostility and resentment against South Africa,  criminal activities across the
border have also been attributed to poverty and unemployment in Lesotho. The closing down of some
of the mines in South Africa has aggravated the problem of poverty, leaving many Basotho families
without a source of income. Some South African farmers have been blamed for contributing to cross-
border stock theft by employing illegal immigrants from Lesotho. When stock theft occur under these
circumstances, it  becomes basically impossible to apprehend the suspects. Some of the farmers
allowed Lesotho citizens to illegally graze their stock on their farms. When the farmers stopped this
practice, they became victims of stock theft  (Jonker et al, 1998: 2-3).   
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For the first few years after its establishment, the Maseru/Ladybrand DLC was not doing very well.
There was negative attitude and lack of trust between these two communities. As a result, these
communities did not have faith in the DLCs, especially the white South African farmers. The white
farmers  had reached a point where they wanted to take the law into their own hands when dealing
with stock thieves. It took a lot of hard work by the DLC members to convince these communities
that they could work out their problems within the DLC forum, and to promote better understanding
and co-operation between them. Members held discussions about problems they were faced with in
carrying out their job. The communities  were then made aware of  the importance of the DLC.
Slowly but surely, the community members began to appreciate the role  the DLC could play in
helping them solve their day-to-day problems with their neighbours. In the post-1990 period, this
DLC has been moving in a positive direction. The members were beginning to have faith in it.  The
community members on both sides had gained an insight into each other’s problems and concerns.
The mutual trust and friendship which was established enabled the committee to expand their
activities.
 
Through the hard work and dedication of the DLC  members,  stock theft in the Maseru/Ladybrand
area has declined remarkably. Some of the  stock owners have been able to recover their stolen stock.
The walkie-talkies which were requested by the  Maseru/Ladybrand DLC  have been of great help
to the members of the committee in reducing stock theft. Increased communication made it easier for
the  Police to apprehend suspects and  recover stolen stock . At the recent meeting of the
Maseru/Ladybrand DLC, which was held in Maseru on the 8th June 1999, it was reported that there
were no recent cases of cross-border stock theft.  This has been attributed to the patrol of the
Caledon River by the members of the border communities on the side of Lesotho and the farmers on
the South African side (Jonker & Monane, 1998). The villagers and the farmers have been assisted
by the armed forces of both countries. 
  
On the issue of development projects, quite a number of them have been successful. The development
projects are aimed at fighting poverty and creating self-employment among the border communities.
The projects have played an important role in the upliftment of these border communities. For
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example, in 1996 the South African High Commission donated some sewing machines to a women’s
self-help project based in Maseru. This project creates self-employment for women. They make
school uniforms for different schools in Maseru.  The women in Maseru and Ladybrand involved in
development projects, through the DLCs, are able to meet from time to time to exchange ideas.
Through the work of the DLCs, the farmers living along the borders on Lesotho side, are being
assisted with the ploughing of their fields at the beginning of every ploughing season. In another
instance, a Mosotho farmer has been assisted to turn a deep donga into a beautiful field planted with
all kinds of crops. Through the efforts of the DLC members, large campaigns  against rabies have
been carried out in the Maseru/Ladybrand area. Most of the animals in this area have received the
anti-rabies injection. This has helped prevent the spread of rabies in the area. 
ii) The Qacha’s Nek/Matatiele DLC 
The Qacha’s Nek/Matatiele DLC was established in 1994. It was established to monitor and advise
the two governments on the situation in the area. The Qacha’s Nek/Matatiele area is the most
troubled border area between Lesotho and South Africa. The problems of this area are complicated
by one main factor which is high crime rate. The high crime rate is exacerbated by the geographical
factors.
There has always been cattle stealing between the peoples of Lesotho and the Transkei. According
to the history of this area,  at one stage during the time of Moshoeshoe I, this area had become a
centre of lawlessness with cattle-stealing by small bands of Basotho and whites  spreading like wild
fire. According to a  police report (Cronje, 1985: 5) there is a feeling amongst some Basotho that part
of the Maluti and Mount Fletcher areas of the Transkei historically belongs to them. So, one of the
reasons for the Basotho to steal stock in Transkei is attributed to the loss of this territory. Stolen
stock is seen as a form of compensation for the use of the land belonging to their forefathers.
 
The relationship between  Transkei and Lesotho during the BNP regime  was not good at all,  but it
has never been this bad. As already mentioned in the last chapter, when the South African government
announced the so-called “independence” of Transkei in 1976, the Transkeian government under
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Matanzima offered Lesotho an alternative route to the sea if Lesotho could give her recognition.
When the Lesotho government refused to give Transkei recognition, the Transkei authorities closed
the entire southern  border.  It has already been discussed in the last chapter, how the Transkei
authorities started harassing Lesotho citizens and how the Transkeians crossed the border illegally
and impounded the livestock of the Basotho. At that time, the situation never got to the stage where
it is, even though it was bad.  It is therefore important  to highlight some of the developments which
resulted in the deterioration of relations between these communities and some of the conditions which
exacerbate the situation.  
Since October 1994, stock theft has assumed a dimension that seriously strained relations between
the peoples of Lesotho and Transkei. As a starting point, after the first democratic election of South
Africa in 1994, the policing structures in the former Transkei collapsed. The Transkei Police
disbanded its Stock-theft Units. This left the door open for the more radical anti-stock-theft
organisations such as “Khotla la Thaba” with its ‘Committee of 12' to gain a free hand in the area.
The inefficiency of the Transkei Police forced the people to look after their own interests and that
included ‘investigating’ their own stock cases.
The cause of poor relations in the Qacha’s Nek/ Matatiele area has been traced to one particular
incident which occurred in December 1994. In this particular incident, 2200 stock belonging to the
Basotho were found grazing illegally  on South African soil and  were impounded by the Transkeians
at Mount Fletcher. This incident created a lot of tension between the two communities. Relations
between them have never been the same since. Transkei farmers in the Mount Fletcher and Maluti
districts insisted that before the stock could be released to the owner, they had to pay for them. Many
of the Basotho did not have enough money to pay for all their stock and, therefore, they had to leave
some of it behind. Stock theft raids from Qacha’s Nek were, therefore, an attempt to recover their
stock. The farmers in Transkei argued that the stock now belonged to them . This has led to a circle
of cross-border stock theft which thrives on revenge (Cronje, 1998: 6-7).
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In 1995, the nature of cross border stock theft began to change. It became more marked by armed
and violent raids, abductions, murders and revenge attacks. The size of raiding parties also increased.
It is no longer individuals involved in the raids. The forces masterminding stock theft raids lies mostly
with the syndicates or “anti stock-theft organizations”, such as “Khotla la Thaba” (Cronje, 1998: 7).
The main problem of the “anti stock-theft organizations” is that they have been infiltrated by the stock
thieves.  These thieves camouflage their involvement with stock theft by pausing as members of the
“anti-stock theft organization”. Hence, it is a well known fact in this area that some of the people who
are claiming to be involved in the fight against stock theft are actually involved in the very crime.
 
To show the seriousness of stock theft in the area,  some of the major events between 1996 and 1998
include the following:
! 1996-01-13: About 40 Basotho armed with R1 rifles attacked a cattle post near New Gate and
attempted to steal 800 sheep and 67 cattle. The South African National Defence Force (SANDF)
intervened and killed three suspects during an exchange of fire.
! 1996-01-23: Basotho men armed with automatic firearms crossed the border and took 560
sheep, 70 cattle and 12 horses in Tabase Administrative area. 
! 1996-05-29: About 300 South African men stole 100 cattle, 30 horses, 14 donkeys and a 1000
goats and sheep in Lesotho at the village of Teletsane.
! 1997-09-15/16: South African citizens crossed the border to steal stock in Lesotho. In this
incident, one Mosotho was shot and killed by the cattle thieves.
! 1997-12-21: Armed men from Mzongwana in South Africa attacked Ramatsiliso village in
Qacha’s Nek,  killed one man, set a house on fire and stole 725 stock.
! 1998-01-01: A large number of South African men attacked a village in Lesotho and stole 508
sheep and 83 cattle and transported the stock to South Africa in a truck. On the same day 11
bodies of South African men were found near Ramatsiliso Border Post. 
! 1998-01-02: A stock post called Mafikalisiu in Lesotho was attacked and 80 sheep and 4 horses
were stolen. Later the South African Police found the body of an unknown man in Matatiele with
an AK47 rifle in his hands.
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! 1998-01-04: 40 Basotho men attacked Cairntoul, fired shots and stole an unspecified number of
stock. When the South Africans crossed the border to recover their stock, they were chased by
Basotho. On the same day 6 bodies were recovered in Mzongwana Location in South Africa
(Cronje, 1998: 8-11) .
These are  just a few examples of the incidents of cross-border stock theft  which took place in the
Qacha’s Nek/Matatiele area within the last two years. 
Another issue which is creating serious problems in this area is the unresolved border demarcation
dispute. The border exists only on maps and it is not fenced. As the population grows on both sides
of the border, there is a demand for more land for grazing. This demand for land, aggravated by the
unclear border line, creates conflict between the two communities. The authorities in both countries
have been reluctant to intervene  for too long. Of concern  is that the longer it is left unattended, the
more conflict it is going to create in the future as evidenced in the stock theft problems cited above.
The destruction of the infrastructure in the area is another problem, especially on the South African
side. The roads in the Maluti and Mount Fletcher district are dilapidated and need to be upgraded.
Furthermore, the terrain in this area is not user friendly to the law enforcers. It is very mountainous.
The stock thieves on the other hand use it to their advantage. It provides very good hide-outs for the
thieves to hide their stolen stock and these hideouts are not easily accessible. It therefore becomes
very difficult for the police to recover stolen stock and to enforce law properly.
When the Qacha’s Nek/Matatiele DLC was established in 1994, it inherited all the problems
mentioned above. It is essential for the situation in the area to be handled  with the utmost  sensitivity.
Therefore, the Qacha’s Nek/Matatiele DLC has been entrusted with the difficult task of monitoring
the situation and advising the governments of both countries accordingly. It is also entrusted with the
task of normalising  relations between these communities.
At the moment, the perfomance of the  Qacha’s Nek/Matatiele DLC is not satisfactory. The
stagnation is primarily caused by the  high crime rate and conspiracy. Kynoch and Ulicki (1999: 6)
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blame the two governments for not doing much to address the issues of cross border crime and
conflict jointly in these area. They argue that lack of meaningful cooperation between the two
governments to address this crisis has allowed a “culture of nationalist/ethnic intolerance to develop
and ensures that violence has continued virtually unchecked” (Kynoch et al., 1999: 6).
The border situation in this area has resulted in high levels of hatred and mistrust which hinders the
functioning of the  Qacha’s Nek/ Matatiele DLC.  If the two governments do not give this matter the
serious attention it deserves, it might escalate into a regional disaster. Considering the rate at which
people are being killed in the stock raids and the ethnic intolerance which has resulted from this
problem, the whole situation might escalating into a full-scale war between the two communities.
Therefore, it is essential that the situation in that area be given special treatment by both governments.
The job of the DLC in this area is to push harder and make the voice of the people be heard by both
governments. They have to make the two governments realise that the people are tired of crime and
demand that the governments put up the necessary infrastructure to assist them fight against crime
and in their efforts of grassroots diplomacy.  
Despite all the problems in the Qacha’s Nek/Matatiele area, some of the members of the Qacha’s
Nek/Matatiele area are optimistic about the future of that DLC. For example, Mokoto (1999) argues
that the DLC has made it possible for the two communities to have a forum where they could discuss
their problems in a meaningful and constructive way.  The DLCs encourages South African
businessmen to come and advertise the products they sell in Lesotho and vise versa. This practice has
familiarised them with each other’s problems. For example, the businessmen on each side are aware
of how this instability in the area is affecting each other’s businesses. Businessmen in Matatiele rely
on their Basotho customers for their businesses to flourish. There was a time (1994) when a group
of hooligans on the South African side made it difficult for Basotho to cross to the Matatiele by
harassing them, and this resulted in murders in some instances. The businessmen in Matatiele
complained that they were losing a lot of money because of this behaviour. The Basotho businessmen
also complained that since it was risky to go to Matatiele, they had buy their stock from far away.
Transport was more expensive and thus, pushing the prices up. This in turn was affecting an ordinary
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citizen in Qacha’s Nek. These problems were brought to the attention of the DLC and each side
began to appreciate how this was affecting them.
The Qacha’s Nek/Matatiele DLC has also invited ‘Skill for Africa’ in 1998 to teach the Qacha
community some business skills they were interested in. Some people have been taught how to run
their own businesses profitably. Some have been taught some farming skills such as starting a poultry
farm.
5.6 How the Political Changes in South Africa have Affected the District Liaison Committees
As predicted by  Evans (cit in Weisfelder, 1997: 32), the new South African government has indeed
adopted an inward looking policy which puts the country and people first. As much as it is interested
in the development of the region as a whole, the South African government has been forced to give
priority to her internal problems. This means correcting the imbalances of the past whereby the non-
whites were marginalised. Therefore, more of the government resources have been put towards the
development of the majority of South Africans, unlike the apartheid government which did not have
the mandate of majority of the people. The South African government cannot spare much of its
resources to assist its neighbours when it has so many internal problems. According to Mjikeliso
(1999), the South African government is not allowed to give aid to other governments. It would
rather finance community-based projects like the ones initiated by the DLCs .  The DLCs continue
to obtain some funding for  their projects from the South African High Commission, but money is no
longer flowing as freely as it used to under the apartheid government. The High Commission has
limited resources at its disposal. Besides, in the post-apartheid period, the South African government
opened many new embassies all over the world, to break away from the isolation of the apartheid
years. And this is where some of the money is being diverted to. 
Instead of paying money  directly into the development projects, some of it  has been re-directed into
‘Skills for Africa’ (SFA). SFA are sponsors of small self-help projects. It is involved in providing
training for the rural communities in different fields. Khalipa (1999) said “SFA deals with the heads,
the hearts, then the hand of people for engagement in the business activities.”  He further contends
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that ‘SFA helps small entrepreneurs to have a vision for their businesses, have their hearts feel the
need of the projects, and then have their hands yielded to performance in the activities’.  As SFA
approach has proved to be useful amongst the rural communities in South Africa, Khalipa strongly
felt that the same approach could help the rural communities in Lesotho to fight poverty and help
themselves. 
SFA is in line with the  African Renaissance. South Africa  no longer regards herself as a donor, but
she is interested in sharing her skills with the rest of the region. At the present moment, ‘Skills for
Africa’ is being invited to different DLCs to find out what kind of skills the border communities in
that area are interested in learning. The DLC members are, therefore, being challenged to reprioritise
their needs so that SFA  may help bring change to small farmers in Lesotho (Mjikeliso, 1999). SFA
has already provided some training to the Qacha’s Nek community. 
5.7  Challenges facing the District Liaison Committees in the Post-Apartheid Period
Currently, the DLCs are faced with a couple of challenges.  Through  its Department of Home
Affairs, the  South Africa government has introduced many  changes which are rather disturbing to
the DLC members and the Basotho nation in general. These have to do with the study permits and
the six month border passes. During the apartheid years,  the South African government used to issue
study permits free of charge to Basotho. But when the government of National Unity came to power,
they introduced exorbitant charges for study permits which  increase every year. In 1994 when
charges for study permits were introduced,  a new study permit cost R265,00. This year (1999), the
charge for a new study permit is R1020.00 (figures from the Department of Home Affairs). For
Basotho living along the borders, this is of great concern because previously, they were able to take
their children to the nearby South African schools which are sometimes closer to them than the local
schools. With the new charges for study permits which are increasing every year, most of these
people cannot afford to do this anymore. This means that their children have to walk longer distances
to the local schools. In some areas like Qacha’s Nek where violent stock theft is endemic, it is not
safe for  children to walk long distances.  This  issue has been raised by  Lesotho government at every
level, from the DLC level to Ministerial level, where the two countries discuss their relations with
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each other. The Lesotho government has managed to convince the South African government to
make the Basotho student stop paying the repatriation money of R500,00, on top of the study permit
money. But they have not been able to convince the South African government to exempt the
Basotho students from paying a lot of money for study permits. 
With regard to the issue of the six month border passes, in the past the South African government
made a special arrangement for Basotho who frequently travel to South Africa to obtain these passes
which allowed them to go in and out of South Africa without having to endorse their passports,
provided they were not staying overnight. These were renewed  every six months. This practice of
issuing the Basotho with six months border passes continued in the post-apartheid period.  Since just
before the 1999 elections, the South African authorities have been issuing six months border passes
which limit travel to the South African border towns near Lesotho. They allege that the old six
months border passes issued before were being misused to reside illegally in South Africa. It seems
that since the 1994 election, the Basotho have been bombarded by the  Department of Home Affairs
with more demands  every year. The DLCs are also trying to address the inconvenience caused to an
ordinary citizen residing along the border by this new six months border pass. 
5.8  Conclusion
The DLCs continue to play a very important part in  relations between Lesotho and South Africa.
They provide very good forums for the promotion of grassroots diplomacy between these two
countries. Changes in regimes have not affected the importance of the work done by the DLCs. The
DLCs  have  adapted to the new environment without much difficulty because the actual nature of
relations between the two countries had not have much of an impact on the way the DLCs are run.
The perfomance of the DLCs are quite impressive. The way the Lesotho borders have been created
constitute the breeding grounds for conflict with her neighbour.  The impact of this has been clashes
over limited resources along the borders. The DLCs  have done very well with the exception of the
Qacha’s Nek/Matatiele DLC which is still struggling to normalise the relation between the border
communities in the area. The Qacha’s Nek/Matatiele DLCs is the newest player in this game of
grassroots diplomacy and it still needs to be given a chance. Besides, the situation in that area is the
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most abnormal one along the borders of the two countries.  The DLCs have turned around the
relations between the border communities  from hostile and untrusting to friendly and mutual trust.
Even the Qacha’s Nek/Matatiele DLC, with all its problems, have achieved a certain degree of
success as indicated earlier. There is still a lot of work to be done, especially in the Qacha’s
Nek/Matatiele area. 
If the DLCs could succeed in convincing  the South African government that Lesotho must be treated
as a special case when issuing  influx control regulations, it could be a major boost to the morale of
the DLC members. As it is, the DLCs have already done a good job of promoting good relations
between Lesotho and South Africa at grassroots level. They remained focussed on maintaining these
good relations between the border communities. The members of the DLCs take their job seriously
and  are prepared to make their efforts worthwhile. 
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CHAPTER 6
6.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this research was to show the importance of grassroots diplomacy in the relationship
between Lesotho and South Africa. The study looked into the role of the DLCs as instruments used
by Lesotho and South Africa to promote grassroots diplomacy between the border communities. The
objective of this research was to argue the case of grassroots diplomacy as an alternative to orthodox
diplomacy. This has been achieved by critically evaluating the role of the DLCs in the relationship
between Lesotho and South Africa and to assess their successes and whether their role has changed
over the years. 
The study  has established that cross-border conflicts are not unique to Lesotho and South Africa
only. Many other countries in the world have been/are involved in  conflict with their neighbours. The
most common cause of conflict between neighbouring countries seems to be the issue of boundaries.
The colonial boundaries in the African continent are a major source of border disputes. The
arbitrariness with which African boundaries were drawn has caused  many problems for the present
African states. The boundaries have divided closely related peoples. For example, the Maasai were
divided between Kenya and Tanzania. The Basotho have been divided between Lesotho and South
Africa. This division has caused strained relations between states over the control of the people and
the territory.
The study has identified two conventional diplomatic methods of dealing with cross-border conflicts.
The first one is the OAU’s Committee for Arbitration, Mediation and Conciliation. Among other
things, the OAU was set up to settle border disputes amongst African states. The OAU did not
achieve much in this respect. It was more concerned with protecting the colonial boundaries than
dealing with the root cause of border disputes in Africa. It lacked the power to institute mandatory
sanctions. As a result, member states were not motivated to take their disputes to the commission.
They saw the OAU as a toothless tiger.
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The second method of dealing with cross-border conflict is presidential mediation. Most countries
opted for presidential mediation to the first method. It has the higher chances of success than the first
one. In this case, African leaders offer their diplomatic services to the countries  involved in a conflict.
Presidential mediation does not have a hundred percent success rate. In most cases, it has succeeded
in bringing short term solutions to the problems.
 
The study has established that there is general failure of top-bottom conventional diplomacy in dealing
with cross-border conflicts. In most of the cases, not all the parties  affected by the conflict are
involved in the negotiation process. As a result, it is detached from the realities on the ground. Roodt
(1996 : 314) argues that the top-bottom strategies do not enjoy much popular support from the
people at grassroots levels.  It has been confirmed  that most countries do not involve the people at
grassroots level in the conducting of diplomacy with their neighbour. Therefore, this inspired me to
consider grassroots diplomacy as an alternative method to conventional diplomacy in dealing with
border conflicts. The case of grassroots diplomacy was an attempt to see how the border relations
are conducted when the people at grassroots level are involved and if the involvement of the
grassroots make any difference in the way those communities relate to one another. The DLCs have
an advantage of having a working relationship with formal government structures. According to
Roodt (1996 : 322), the advantage of such a relationship between organs of civil society and the
formal government structures is that ‘they move beyond the mere demands of protest politics and
begin to play both a watchdog role and a developmental one, especially in terms of genuinely
representing people’s needs and wants.’
To give the background to the practice  of grassroots diplomacy by the Lesotho and the South
African governments, the paper evaluated the historical background to the border relations between
the two countries. The paper argues that the current border problems between Lesotho and South
Africa, the main one being stock theft, have their origins in the way Lesotho came into being as a
nation state. Over the years, the Basotho were slowly pushed from the land they occupied on the flat
plains between the Orange River and the Caledon River and squeezed into the present Lesotho,
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which mainly consists of mountains, by the Afrikaner farmers upon their arrival in the Free State.
Lesotho lost a big part of its population to South Africa to the effect that today, there are more
Basotho in South Africa than in Lesotho itself. The  Basotho lost a large part of their arable land to
these new arrivals. This had a devastating effect on the Basotho who are an agricultural society and
as the population grew, the situation got worse. The demand for land for both residential and
agricultural purposes increased. This has had a negative impact on food security.  Lesotho, which
was once the  grain basket of South Africa, is now dependent on South Africa for the supply of its
staple food. The historical dispossession of the Basotho left the door open for perpetual conflict
between Lesotho and South Africa. The tension created by this loss of land is greatly felt by the
border communities who feel the constant pressure to expand into the neighbouring country and who
are obliged to see what could  have been theirs on a daily basis.
The loss of such a big portion of their land was very much resented by the Basotho. They continued
to disregard the drawn boundaries and to cross the borders to  steal  stock from their neighbours who
had deprived them of their land. Ever since that time, there has been a feeling amongst some Basotho
that taking  livestock from the neighbouring white farms was not stealing, but simply taking what
rightfully belongs to them. So, stock theft still constitutes the major problem for communities living
along the borders.
The issue of the conquered  territory has been of great concern throughout the history of the relations
between Lesotho and South Africa. It has caused a lot of tension between the two governments in
the past. During British rule in Lesotho, no specific policy was followed to deal with this boundary
issue. At some stage, the British government attempted to disarm the Basotho but they were
embarrassingly defeated and the whole issue of trying to disarm the Basotho was abandoned.  Later,
it was  assumed   that Lesotho would join the Union of South Africa, but Lesotho never joined the
Union because of the traditional hostility of the South African government. The British government
decided to give all its Protectorates independence instead. Throughout the British rule, there were
these tendencies by the British government to favour the Afrikaners in their clashes with Basotho. It
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could be observed that the British annexation of Lesotho was more to protect its economic interest
than to protect the Basotho. 
In the recent years, poverty in Lesotho has also aggravated the border problems between Lesotho and
South Africa. In the 1930s, the total agricultural output of Lesotho started deteriorating due to the
pressures put on the British colonial government of Lesotho by the South African government. But,
the deteriorating agricultural output was supplemented by the wages of the migrant labourers for
many Basotho families. The recession in the price of gold in the world market has had a negative
impact on Lesotho in particular, because of its dependence on the employment of its people in the
South African mines.  A large number of Basotho miners have already been retrenched. This means
that poverty in Lesotho is on the increase. The increasing poverty has resulted in the rise of cross-
border crimes.   
Just before independence (1966),  the issue of the conquered territory was taken up by the leading
political parties in Lesotho and they approached the United Nations about it. They  used it to gain
national support and international sympathy. After independence, the BNP government of Lesotho
took it up with the South African government. This issue has never been pursued to the fullest by the
Lesotho government. 
In the post-1970 period, the border problems between the two countries were further exacerbated
by the hostile relations which existed between the two governments. In the circumstances of the rising
hostility between the two governments,  the politicians  in Lesotho politicised the  border issue. They
used it to rally the internal and external support, and to divert the attention of the people from their
own political problems. The Prime Minister of Lesotho used to talk about this issue of the conquered
territory when addressing the pitsos. Such talks rekindled the anger the Basotho felt for the loss of
their territory and  inspired some of the cattle rustlers to be more determined to steal stock as a way
of redressing the wrongs of the past.
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The two governments were constantly confronting each other at every available opportunity. The
relations between the two countries deteriorated very fast. The Lesotho government’s support of the
ANC refugees made the relations  between the two governments to be strained further.  The South
African government retaliated by establishing LLA  and using it to destabilise Lesotho. The Lesotho
government used the LLA activities to embarrass the South African government internationally. They
raised this issue of the LLA activities and the involvement of the South African government in the
General Assembly and this used to embarrass the South African government. The South African
businessmen and farmers were also putting a lot of pressure on their government to iron out things
with the Lesotho government because the hostilities had a negative impact on their businesses. This
pressure is what finally led to a movement towards grassroots diplomacy.
 
By 1980, relations had deteriorated to the extent that the head of neither government  was willing to
meet his counterpart in his country. But the pressure on the South African government to work things
out with Lesotho was too much and could not be ignored any longer.  Finally, the two heads of
government agreed to meet at Peka Bridge on the 20th August 1980, to try and defuse the hostility
which existed between the two countries. Among the things which were discussed at this meeting was
the situation which  prevailed in the border areas.  One good thing which came out of this meeting
was the decision to set up a Lesotho/South Africa Liaison Committee which was to look at ways to
defuse tension between the two countries and recommend areas of cooperation. Although the meeting
was not a complete success, it was a milestone in relations between these two countries in that it
marked the beginning of grassroots diplomacy between the two. 
The IGLC was established in 1980. The members of the IGLC, who were mostly senior government
officials of both countries, were happy with the achievements of the IGLC but still they felt that it was
necessary that their efforts should be followed up at grassroots levels by the border communities in
order to try and establish good relations between themselves and their counterparts on the other side
of the border. They, therefore, decided to establish the DLCs. The DLCs were established to deal
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with border difficulties between border communities on both sides of the border and to harmonise
relations between the two countries at the borders.
The DLCs have seen changes in regimes in both countries. In Lesotho they have seen the BNP
government, the military government, the BCP government and the present LCD (Lesotho Congress
for  Democracy) government. In South Africa, they have seen the apartheid government and the
Government of National Unity led by the ANC government. The changes in regimes have not had an
impact on the functioning of the DLCs.  All these subsequent governments have embraced this idea
of the DLCs.  The DLCs continued to promote the interests of the border communities and to deal
with problems which threaten peace between the two countries. Throughout these years, the DLCs
have stayed out of party politics. As a result, the DLCs have remained  focused on their objectives.
They have never lost touch with the needs of the border communities despite what was happening
at the top. The DLCs have never been dragged into the political fights between the politicians. They
act as watchdogs and representative of people’s needs and wants.
The DLCs have generally performed well. They have promoted better understanding and cooperation
between their respective communities. In many instances, common problems have been  resolved at
grassroots level. These forums have provided an opportunity for these communities to gain an insight
of the concerns and problems of their neighbours. The DLCs have promoted good relations based
on mutual trust and friendship between their communities. Over the years, the DLCs have been able
to expand their activities based on this mutual trust and friendship. They have been able to shift their
focus from dealing with border problems to encouraging more development cooperation between the
border communities in a fight against poverty.  
In conclusion, the DLCs have played a very important role in the relationship between Lesotho and
South Africa. They have succeeded where conventional diplomacy has failed. They have created good
relations between the two countries at grassroots level. The good relations at grassroots level have
made work easier for the governments. Some of the responsibilities of the governments have been
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taken over by the DLCs and this have made their work-load lighter. The DLCs have resolved many
problems of a bilateral nature between the two countries at grassroots levels. There is no doubt that
grassroots diplomacy is working for Lesotho and South Africa. The two governments have come to
appreciate the practicality of involving grassroots people in the issues which affect them directly and
this has paid off.  I believe that the relationship between Lesotho and South Africa would not have
been this good had it not been for the practice of grassroots diplomacy. The practice of grassroots
diplomacy has saved the two countries from  tense relations at the borders, which could easily have
led to war or the severing of diplomatic relations. Grassroots diplomacy in the case of Lesotho and
South Africa has complimented  orthodox diplomacy very well. Because of the relationship between
the DLCs and the governments of the two countries, the DLCs have acted as the voice of the people
in the governmental structures. The issues affecting people at grassroots levels have been brought to
the attention of the two governments by the DLCs. This way, the two governments have stayed in
touch with the realities on the grounds.  It has stood the test of time because even during the time
when the relations between the two governments at the top were at their lowest ebb, the practice of
grassroots diplomacy continued. 
The example of Lesotho and South Africa could therefore, be copied by other countries, especially
African countries which need one another for their survival  but lack the practical realism to see this.
The politicians  are too  involved in their own little struggles to realise the needs of the people at
grassroots level and the implications of full cooperation with neighbours. They therefore, lose the
opportunity for cooperation. For example, in the case of the Senegal-Mauritania conflict on the issue
of agricultural land in 1989, a committee consisting of representatives of the border communities of
both countries was appointed to evaluate the problems in the area and advice both governments
accordingly. The committee agreed on the number of measures including the return of the Senegalese
farmers who have been expelled from their fields in the border area . But the Mauritanian government
did not support the recommendations of that committee and the whole situation turned into a disaster
whereby the nationals of one country were being chased out of the other country (Parker, 1991 :
159). The two countries, therefore, missed the opportunity of utilising grassroots diplomacy because
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the politicians blocked  the way. The economies of both these countries were badly affected by this
conflict.
The fact that the DLCs were never under the influence of party politics has a lot to do with their
success. It has saved the DLCs from the political squabbles at the top.  Governments have come and
gone, but the DLCs have not undergone major transformations.  All the successive governments have
embraced the DLC concept.  Perhaps, the history between the two countries has taught them that
grassroots diplomacy is important.  Through the practice of grassroots diplomacy, a clear boundary
has been drawn between the problems which affect the day-to-day lives of people at grassroots levels
and the problems at governmental level.  The practice of grassroots diplomacy shows that sometimes,
these two kinds of problems need to be treated separately to avoid the sufferings of people at
grassroots levels unnecessarily. The DLCs have tried to ensure that the interests of the people at
grassroots levels are not sidelined during political squabbles. The DLCs have no problem adapting
to their changed political environment because they are not directly affected by the changes.
The only DLC which has been having some problems at the present moment is the Qacha’s
Nek/Matatiele DLC. The reason for this is that the criminal activities of violent stock thieves in the
area are hindering the work of the DLC and it is also the newest of all the DLCs. The Qacha’s
Nek/Matatiele area has special problems which need special attention from both governments and not
only from the DLC. Kynoch and Ulicki (1999 : 6) are of the view that the two governments are
neglecting this areas because it is too remote from the centers of power in both countries. The
problem of the Qacha’s Nek/Matatiele area is a very urgent matter which needs immediate attention.
Since the DLC members in this area have been given a mandate to monitor the situation and advice
both governments accordingly, they have a duty to bring the attention of both governments to this
matter immediately and make them realise that it might escalate into war if security measures are not
stepped up in the area.  
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Despite all the problems of the Qacha’s Nek/Matatiele area, the DLC has achieved a certain level of
success.  It has provided a forum whereby representatives of both communities could discuss their
problems in a much more constructive and meaningful way. The situation in this area has reached a
point where it cannot be left in the hands of the DLC to work out the problem. It is going to take
more than grassroots diplomacy to overcome this problem. The DLC is going to need a lot of
assistance  from the central  governments.  
A number of measures which could make the work of the DLCs  easier and which could be
implemented by both governments have been suggested by Mjikeliso (1999). The governments should
look into the question of equal distribution and decentralisation of resources. For example, more
resources should be directed into the Qacha’s Nek/Matatiele area to upgrade the infrastructure and
to improve the policing in that area.  Both governments should also seek to put in place projects
which employ people in order to fight poverty which is the main source of crime. These projects
should be given autonomy and the community should become involved. People should not be made
to feel that the projects are being imposed on them because they will not  be as committed as they
would be if they felt that it was their project. Governments should only become involved when there
is corruption. For example, there is a case in the district of Mafeteng, Lesotho, where the South
African High Commission donated a hammer-mill to a cooperative in this district. It does not seem
to be clear who is benefitting from that hammer-mill and who the members of that cooperative are.
Therefore, there is a need for both governments to device some control measures which will ensure
that the money and the equipment they invest in community based  projects do not end up in the
wrong hands. The people have to be taught that such projects are for them as a group and not for
certain individuals.  People should be assisted with training and  ‘Skills for Africa’ is a positive step
in that direction. The DLCs should remain outside party politics. These measures would definitely
improve the work of the DLCs.
In my opinion, the practice of grassroots diplomacy cannot bring a permanent solution to the border
problems between Lesotho and South Africa, but, it surely has contributed in a positive way towards
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improving the relations of the border communities of these two countries.  The issue of the lost land
by the Basotho has not been addressed sufficiently by both governments of Lesotho and South Africa.
The research has demonstrated that the issue had been raised a couple of times during the BNP
regime in Lesotho, and even before Lesotho’s independence by the political parties. But the
governments of the two countries have never really sat down to try and conclude this issue of
‘conquered territory’. It is therefore, my view that, despite all the efforts of the DLCs to maintain
good relations at the borders, the border conflicts will still arise from time to time until a final
settlement on this issue is reached. 
The two governments of Lesotho and South Africa could try and work out the issue of the conquered
territory on their own, or they could involve the international community. Two options could be
considered when settling this land issue between Lesotho and South Africa. Firstly, South Africa
could consider returning the ‘conquered territory’ to its rightful owners, namely, the Basotho. The
South African government has already done it in the case of Namibia by handing over Walvis Bay and
the twelve associated Guano islands to the later on the 28th February 1994 (Simon, 1994: 127).
Secondly, the two countries could consider the incorporation of Lesotho into South Africa so that
all the people could have equal access to the limited land resources. The governments of Lesotho and
South Africa have to take into consideration, the warning of Falola (1996: 10) that as long as
different countries pursue policies that disregard the fact that the people who have been divided by
the colonial borders were previously members of the same nation, then frontier tensions will continue.
Therefore, these two countries have to bear this warning in mind when making policies.  This are just
some suggestions and they are not necessarily, the solution to the border problems. As suggested by
Mukisa (1997) and the others, the colonisation of the African continent brought all these border
problems for the post-colonial African states.  Therefore, I feel that the ex-colonial masters should
contribute financially towards solving the border clashes in the African continent.     
The study of grassroots diplomacy between Lesotho and South Africa was just a tip of an iceberg.
As stated in the beginning of this paper, this is the area of diplomacy which have not yet received
much scholarly attention. Border conflicts are endemic in the African continent. In most cases the
circumstances surrounding the border conflicts are similar to those of Lesotho and South Africa,
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namely, the drawing of the colonial map. So, for further research, a study could be carried out to see
how applicable the concept of grassroots diplomacy could be in the rest of the African continent. This
could answer the question of whether grassroots diplomacy could be a sustainable solution to the
border conflicts in the continent, or whether more needs to be done.
Another study could be carried out to determine the extend to which the DLCs actually represented
the interest of the people. The reason for suggesting this is that, in most countries, the attempt to
encourage genuine participation of the public in civil society has been undermined by the local elites
who monopolise power and who do not encourage widespread participation (Roodt, 1996: 323).  
Therefore, it could be interesting to find out whether the DLCs represent the interests of the whole
border communities or just a small group of elites in those areas.   
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